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Notes
TITLE IX: CREATING UNEQUAL EQUALITY
THROUGH APPLICATION OF THE
PROPORTIONALITY STANDARD IN
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
I. INTRODUCTION
Aaron Roberts is a three-sport high school senior in Smalltown,
Indiana.1 As he looks for a university to attend next year, he wants to
find a school that not only offers his favorite sport, hockey, but one that
may also be able to give him a scholarship to play. Unfortunately, many
of the top schools in the area, such as Indiana University and Purdue, do
not offer a men’s hockey program. Finally, Aaron finds a small Division
III school that offers a hockey team, and he is excited to spend the next
four years of his college career playing hockey for Petite University
(“PU”). PU has been competitive in its conference for many years,
winning the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) Division
III tournament on several occasions. When Aaron gets to campus, he
joins the team and has a great first season. The team wins its conference
and makes an appearance in the NCAA tournament. However, after
Aaron’s freshman season, the school decides to cut the men’s hockey
program at PU to comply with Title IX. He must spend the next three
years playing club hockey instead of enjoying the varsity experience he
anticipated.2
Aaron’s story is not uncommon for men’s low-revenue athletic teams
throughout the country. In the last twenty years, more than eight
hundred men’s athletic teams have been eliminated from collegiate
programs.3 With universities receiving fewer private donations and
operating budgets being downsized, athletic programs are under more
The author created fictional story to illustrate the adverse effects of Title IX’s current
application to men’s athletic teams, which is the issue of this Note.
2
If Aaron decides to transfer schools once the program is cut, he will most likely have
to sit out a year from participating, which can cause problems for the academic transfer of
credits and eligibility. See NCAA, TRANSFER 101: BASIC INFORMATION YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT
TRANSFERRING
TO
AN
NCAA
COLLEGE
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/TGONLINE2011.pdf (stating that
eligibility after transfer may be postponed unless an exception is allowed by the new
school, and exceptions are laid out based on the division of the old and new school).
3
Ryan T. Smith, Note, “Bull’s Eye”: How Public Universities in West Virginia Can
Creatively Comply with Title IX Without the Targeted Elimination of Men’s Sports Teams, 110 W.
VA. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (2008).
1
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pressure than ever to cut costs.4 Men’s athletic teams often take the
brunt of these cuts to allow schools to comply with the Title IX
proportionality requirement, which requires schools to structure athletic
programs based on the proportion of students who attend the
university.5 Although Title IX has made large strides in creating
opportunities for women in athletics, in the forty years since its
inception, the proportionality requirement of compliance has now
started creating excessive adverse effects for men’s teams.6 Due to its
dramatic effect on all aspects of education, especially athletics, scholars
have analyzed Title IX’s application and interpretation to determine the
validity and effectiveness of the statute since its enactment in 1972.7
See infra notes 41, 56 and accompanying text (discussing the current trend of cuts in
men’s athletics and the cost efficiency of using cuts to save money within the department).
5
See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX statutory language and
the regulations set forth to assess compliance).
6
See infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing how the proportionality
requirement has led to a trend of cutting men’s athletic teams to comply with Title IX); see
also Part II.C.2 (highlighting cases brought under Title IX by members of men’s athletic
teams due to the discrimination of the Title IX proportionality requirement).
7
See generally Eric Bentley, Title IX: The Technical Knockout for Men’s Non-Revenue Sports,
33 J.L. & EDUC. 139 (2004) (evaluating Title IX and its effect on intercollegiate athletics,
specifically on men’s non-revenue sports teams); Erin E. Buzuvis, Survey Says . . . A Critical
Analysis of the New Title IX Policy and a Proposal for Reform, 91 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2006)
(discussing Title IX’s history and the three-prong test, focusing on the model survey to
assess prong three); Matthew L. Daniel, Title IX and Gender Equity in College Athletics: How
Honesty Might Avert a Crisis, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 255 (1995) (analyzing how Title IX
affects gender equity in athletics); Suzanne Eckes, Commentary, Another Pin for Women:
The National Wrestling Coaches Associations’ Title IX Case is Dismissed, 182 ED. LAW. REP. 683
(2004) (discussing the court’s ruling in a lawsuit filed by the National Wrestling Coaches
Association alleging Title IX violations for elimination of teams); Elisa Hatlevig, Title IX
Compliance: Looking Past the Proportionality Prong, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 87 (2005) (evaluating
Title IX compliance and noting that the proportionality standard may not be the most
equitable); Daniel R. Marburger & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Is Title IX Really to Blame for the
Decline in Intercollegiate Men’s Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 65 (2003)
(analyzing the economic effects of athletic departments and the effects on Title IX
compliance); J. Brad Reich, All the [Athletes] Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal than Others:
An Objective Evaluation of Title IX’s Past, Present, and Recommendations for Its Future, 108
PENN ST. L. REV. 525 (2003) (evaluating the evolution of Title IX and presenting possibilities
to clarify the compliance standards to reduce confusion and create alternative ways for
institutions to comply with Title IX); Armand B. Alacbay, Note, Are Intercollegiate Sports
Programs a Buck Short? Examining the Latest Attack on Title IX, 14 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
255 (2004) (examining the history of Title IX and discussing the effect Title IX has on athletic
programs); Elizabeth A. Hueben, Note, Revolution, Numbers, IX: The Thirtieth Anniversary of
Title IX and the Proportionality Challenge, 71 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 659 (2003) (discussing
evolution of Title IX and challenges presented by the proportionality requirement of
compliance standards); Ross A. Jurewitz, Note, Playing at Even Strength: Reforming Title IX
Enforcement in Intercollegiate Athletics, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 283 (2000)
(discussing the adverse effects of Title IX on men’s athletic teams); David Klinker,
Comment, Why Conforming With Title IX Hurts Men’s Collegiate Sports, 13 SETON HALL J.
4
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This Note will discuss Title IX’s effect on men’s athletic teams and
how its proportionality requirement is no longer the best way for
universities to comply with the statute. Part II will review the history of
the Civil Rights Act and the inception of Title IX.8 It will also discuss
landmark Title IX cases and the courts’ rulings and rationale of these
cases.9 Further, Part II will highlight a new wave of cases that are
popping up all over the country—reverse discrimination actions brought
by men’s athletic teams that have been eliminated.10 Part III of this Note
will analyze Title IX’s effect on institutions, and discuss how Title IX has
come full-circle and now discriminates against men solely due to their
gender.11 Part III will also analyze the problems the proportionality
prong creates and the benefits of focusing on interest when assessing
equality of offerings within athletic departments.12 Finally, Part IV will
propose a new standard of compliance for universities that would
amend the proportionality requirement to allow schools to focus on
providing opportunities for all students based on genuine interest and
desirability of the program.13

SPORT L. 73 (2003) (discussing the history and interpretation of Title IX and examining
whether the proportionality requirement is consistent with the purpose of Title IX);
Christopher Paul Reuscher, Comment, Giving the Bat Back to Casey: Suggestions to Reform
Title IX’s Inequitable Application to Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 AKRON L. REV. 117 (2001)
(analyzing Title IX and the adverse effects of its application in college athletics); Ronnie
Wade Robertson, Comment, Tilting at Windmills: The Relationship Between Men’s NonRevenue Sports and Women’s Sports, 76 MISS. L.J. 297 (2006) (analyzing the compliance
requirements under Title IX while focusing on the problems created by the proportionality
standard); Smith, supra note 3 (discussing the history and evolution of Title IX and focusing
on options for schools in West Virginia to comply with Title IX without cutting teams);
Megan K. Starace, Comment, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX: Do Men Have a Sporting
Chance?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189 (2001) (examining Title IX’s history and claims
under the statute).
8
See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the background of the Civil Rights Act, generally,
and Title IX, specifically, as well as the evolution and application of Title IX).
9
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing influential cases under Title IX, which have shaped the
law’s current application).
10
See infra Part II.C.2 (highlighting recent cases brought by men’s athletic teams
claiming reverse discrimination under Title IX).
11
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the shortcomings of Title IX’s current application).
12
See infra Parts III.B–C (evaluating problems, benefits, and proposed solutions to the
proportionality prong and the fully and effectively accommodated prong of the compliance
requirements).
13
See infra Part IV (proposing new compliance standards and evaluation criteria for
assessing overall interest in sports to assist universities in determining which sports to
offer).
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II. BACKGROUND
The purpose of Title IX is to prevent discrimination based on sex in
educational institutions.14 This Part discusses Title IX from its enactment
to its current state.15 Part II.A discusses the history of Title IX, from its
enactment in 1972 to the latest policy interpretation in 2010.16 The
evolution of Title IX and how it has been applied to cases is discussed in
Part II.B.17 Finally, this Part discusses landmark cases that have been
decided under Title IX in Part II.C.18 The discussion starts with
traditional Title IX cases brought by female student-athletes and
concludes with cases brought by male student-athletes claiming reverse
discrimination under Title IX.19
A. History of Title IX
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prohibit discrimination
and provide “full and equal enjoyment” to “any place of public
accommodation” regardless “of race, color, religion, or national origin.”20
Title IX, enacted in 1972 as part of the Educational Amendments, is an
extension of this Act that prohibits discrimination based on sex in
educational programs receiving federal funding.21 Title IX expressly
applies to all “public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary
school[s], or any institution of vocational, professional, or higher
education.”22 Although the statute applies to all aspects and levels of
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 96-459, at 35 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1612, 1614 (stating that the purpose for the Educational Amendments is to
promote the general welfare of the United States, and more specifically to prohibit
educational institutions from giving preferential or different treatment to members of one
sex when a “historic disparity” has been shown); S. REP. NO. 96-49, at 11 (1979), reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1514, 1525 (noting that the need for equal access to educational activities
is paramount, and Title IX is specifically designed to help end sex discrimination).
15
See infra Parts II.A–C (discussing the history and evolution of Title IX, as well as
current cases under the statute).
16
See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of Title IX).
17
See infra Part II.B (examining the evolution of Title IX).
18
See infra Part II.C (highlighting landmark cases under Title IX).
19
See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing traditional Title IX cases brought under the statute,
as well as reverse discrimination cases brought under Title IX).
20
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006); see Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/coord/titlevi.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)
(stating that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or national origin).
21
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance . . . .” Id.
22
Id. § 1681(c).
14
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education, its effect is most recognizable in college athletics.23 Title IX
requires, aside from proportional opportunities, that men’s and women’s
athletic programs be relatively equal in categories such as travel,
equipment, and tutoring.24
When Title IX was first implemented, there was some confusion as to
how it should apply to college athletics.25 More specifically, confusion
arose as to whether Title IX applied to entire institutions or only to the
specific programs that received federal funding.26 Congress answered
this question by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which
expressly stated that Title IX applies to all areas of an educational
institution that receive federal funding.27 Due to continued confusion,
however, Congress directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare (“HEW”) to create regulations explaining Title IX standards and
requirements.28 The purpose of the regulations was to provide guidance
to athletic programs and to make it clear that any kind of gender
discrimination would result in a Title IX violation.29 The Office of Civil
Rights (“OCR”), under the Department of Education (“ED”), which is
See History of Title IX, TITLE IX.INFO (2012), http://www.titleix.info/History/HistoryOverview.aspx (stating that most people who have heard of Title IX think it only applies to
athletics). See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (discussing prohibition of discrimination in
educational programs, but never specifically mentioning athletics).
24
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1979). Title IX
requires schools to provide comparable amenities to both men’s and women’s sports teams
in such categories as: (1) equipment and supplies; (2) scheduling of games and practice
times; (3) travel and per diem allowances; (4) opportunity to receive coaching and
academic tutoring; and (5) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors. Id.
25
See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting confusion as to the
scope of Title IX’s coverage and acceptable avenues of compliance because of an absence of
legislative materials, lack of committee report, and the fact that intercollegiate athletics was
only mentioned twice during the congressional debate of the matter); see also Equity in
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (W.D. Va. 2009) (noting that
“‘[a]fter Title IX was passed, there were efforts to limit the effect’” on athletics (quoting
McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 287 (2d. Cir. 2004))).
26
Compare Univ. of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321, 329 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that
a university’s athletic department was not covered by Title IX if it did not receive direct
federal funding), with Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1982) (ruling that an
intercollegiate athletic program was subject to Title IX if the university as a whole received
federal funding).
27
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). Title IX
applies to all of the operations of an educational institution, any part of which is extended
federal financial assistance. Id.
28
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (explaining regulatory framework of Title IX as issued by
HEW).
29
See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,416 (Dec. 11, 1979)
(outlining compliance criteria and policy reasons for the Title IX regulations and the Policy
Interpretation, which include assessing the equivalence of general athletic program
components between genders).
23
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responsible for the implementation and enforcement of Title IX,
emphasized the necessity for equal opportunities within intercollegiate
athletics for all athletes, regardless of gender.30
In the three years following this initial explanation of the statute, the
ED received over one hundred discrimination complaints involving
In 1979, the OCR issued a “Policy
more than fifty schools.31
Interpretation” that offered a more detailed measure of equal athletic
opportunity as well as clearer guidelines for schools to follow.32 The
Policy Interpretation outlined how schools could effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of male and female athletes.33
The OCR provided a three-prong test for schools to utilize in evaluating
Title IX compliance, which can be satisfied if any one of the following
prongs is met:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation
opportunities for male and female students are provided
in numbers substantially proportionate to their
respective enrollments; or
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2009). A recipient of federal funding that operates or sponsors
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics is required to provide equal athletic
opportunities for members of both sexes. Id. The OCR evaluates a school’s compliance to
equal opportunity based on ten non-exclusive factors: (1) whether the selection of sports
and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of
both sexes; (2) the provision of equipment and supplies; (3) scheduling of games and
practices; (4) travel and per diem allowances; (5) opportunity to receive coaching and
academic tutoring; (6) assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) provision of
locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) provision of medical and training
facilities and services; (9) provision of housing and dining facilities; and (10) publicity. Id.;
see Cohen, 991 F.2d at 895 (explaining the split of the HEW into the Department of Health
and Human Services and the ED, and the Office of Civil Rights’ duties under the ED in
relation to Title IX compliance).
31
See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413 (“By the end of July
1978, the [ED] had received nearly [one hundred] complaints alleging discrimination in
athletics . . . .”); see also Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896 (noting that the initial issuance of the
regulations resulted in numerous complaints against many collegiate institutions).
32
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,413. “The . . . Policy
Interpretation represents the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s
interpretation of the intercollegiate athletic provisions of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 and its implementing regulation.” Id.
33
Id. at 71,418. To “effectively accommodat[e] the interests and abilities of male and
female athletes, institutions must provide both the opportunity for individuals of each sex
to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for athletes of each sex to have competitive
team schedules which equally reflect their abilities.” Id.; see also Letter from Russlynn Ali,
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ. (Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from
Russlynn Ali], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague20100420.pdf (indicating that procedures should be easy to understand and should be
distributed to students, coaches, and employees).
30
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(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes,
whether the institution can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and
the institution cannot show a continuing practice of
program expansion such as that cited above, whether it
can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of
the members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by the present program.34
Typically, schools comply by conforming with the first prong of the
test because proportionality of students is the most objective standard
and the easiest with which to comply.35 Historically, the second prong of
the test has been hard for universities to satisfy due to the short time in
which the expansion of programs has been occurring.36 Showing not
only a history, but also a continuation of expansion in women’s athletics
34
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. Determination of
compliance will be based on:
a. Whether the policies of an institution are discriminatory in language
or effect; or
b. Whether disparities of a substantial and unjustified nature in the
benefits, treatment, services, or opportunities afforded male and
female athletes exist in the institution’s program as a whole; or
c. Whether disparities in individual segments of the program with
respect to benefits, treatment, services, or opportunities are substantial
enough in and of themselves to deny equality of athletic opportunity.
Id.
35
See H. Clay McEldowney, As Colleges Cut Athletics, Title IX Creates an Injustice to Men,
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/08/05/AR2009080503089.html (explaining that “compliance” for universities usually
“means applying a quota standard . . . [that requires] schools [to] maintain the same ratio of
men and women on the playing field as in the classroom”); see also Alyssa Benedetto,
College Athletics Affected by Title IX, THE REV. (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.udreview.com/
2.1979/college-athletics-affected-by-title-ix-1.138104 (“Under Title IX, there must be
proportionality between men’s and women’s teams based on the total enrollment at the
school.”); Eric McErlain, Where Title IX Went Wrong, SAVING SPORTS (Jan. 23, 2008, 4:45 PM),
http://savingsports.blogspot.com/2008_01_01_archive.html (discussing problems with
Title IX’s proportionality requirement and how it has been applied in athletic
departments).
36
See MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 909 (2d ed.
2007) (noting that in light of the thirty plus years since Title IX’s enactment, it is difficult for
a school to show “a history and continuing practice of program expansion for women if the
school still does not provide proportionally equal opportunities for both sexes”).
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has proven difficult for many universities.37 Likewise, the third prong of
the test has been difficult for schools to satisfy.38 Even if a school is
under the impression that it is providing adequate opportunities, the
filing of a complaint for a Title IX violation shows that the school has not
met all the interests of the underrepresented gender.39 Due to the
difficulties and ambiguity of the second and third prongs, more schools
are electing to comply with Title IX’s compliance requirements by
offering athletic opportunities that are substantially proportionate to
enrollment.40 However, complying with the proportionality standard
37
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1999)
(claiming a Title IX violation for cutting the men’s wrestling team instead of creating more
women’s teams to comply with statute); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 635 (7th
Cir. 1999) (asserting a Title IX violation for elimination of men’s wrestling and soccer teams
instead of meeting the proportionality requirement by expanding women’s opportunities);
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994) (bringing a civil rights action for
elimination of a men’s swimming program to cut costs and remain competitive, while
allowing women’s teams to remain without creating new teams); see also McEldowney,
supra note 35 (stating that teams are being cut across the country to help relieve the
financial burden athletic programs are facing, instead of creating new opportunities for
women).
38
See Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (explaining that Title IX
compliance may be satisfied if an institution can “demonstrate[] that the interests and
abilities of the members of [the underrepresented] sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated”); COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905 (noting that although the third
prong sets a high standard, it is not absolute, as the mere fact that there are some female
students interested in a sport does not ipso facto require the school to provide a team to
comply with the third benchmark); Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (determining
compliance for the third prong depends on all of the following questions: “1. Is there [an]
unmet interest in a particular sport? 2. Is there sufficient ability to sustain a team in the
sport? 3. Is there a reasonable expectation of competition for the team?”).
39
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (“[A]ny time female students bring a Title
IX lawsuit . . . it is difficult for a college to defend its lack of proportional opportunities by
arguing that it has fully accommodated women’s interests and abilities.” (quoting
Kimberly Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality
Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 741
(2003)).
40
See Neal, 198 F.3d at 770 (stating that the university had to provide athletics
opportunities in proportion to the gender composition of the student body); Boulahanis, 198
F.3d at 641 (ruling that the university’s elimination of men’s soccer and wrestling programs
helped to achieve Title IX compliance under the proportionality standard); Kelley, 35 F.3d at
272–73 (holding that even after eliminating the men’s swimming program, men’s
participation in athletics continued to be more than substantially proportionate to women’s
participation, such that women’s teams could not be eliminated for fear of violating Title
IX); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 1993) (granting preliminary injunction
to reinstate women’s varsity field hockey and gymnastics to meet proportionality
requirement of Title IX); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting
preliminary injunction restoring women’s gymnastics and volleyball teams to varsity status
to comply with Title IX); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (“Most
commentators simply assume that compliance will, at the end of the day, be measured in

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/8

Ambrosius: Title IX: Creating Unequal Equality through Application of the Pr

2012]

Unequal Equality

565

has required schools to cut men’s athletic teams more frequently in hard
economic times because athletic departments are unable to support the
large number of teams; schools must also keep proportionality in mind
when making cuts.41
In 2005, the OCR issued an additional clarification regarding
application of the third prong of the compliance test.42 It also provided a
model survey for institutions to measure student interest in participating
in intercollegiate athletics and included specific guidelines for
implementation.43 However, the OCR has recently determined that the
2005
Additional
Clarification
was
inconsistent
with
the
nondiscriminatory methods set forth by the Policy Interpretation.44 In
terms of substantial proportionality . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Julia Lamber,
Intercollegiate Athletics: The Program Expansion Standard Under Title IX’s Policy Interpretation,
12 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 31, 33 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41
See Rebecca Leung, The Battle Over Title IX, CBS NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:37
PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/27/60minutes/main560723.shtml
(noting that male athletes on college campuses are claiming they are losing out to women’s
athletics due to Title IX, and since there is no money to add women’s teams, schools must
cut men’s teams to comply with the proportionality requirement); McEldowney, supra note
35 (indicating that men’s teams often take the brunt of athletic department cuts).
42
See Office For Civil Rights: Case Resolution and Investigation Manual, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcrm.html (last updated May 2005)
(providing further clarification to schools for compliance with option three of the three-part
test); see also Letter from Mary Frances O’Shea, Nat’l Coordinator for Title IX Athletics,
Office for Civil Rights, to David V. Stead, Exec. Dir. of Minn. State High School League
(Apr. 11, 2000), available at http://66.40.5.5/Content/Articles/Issues/Title-IX/C/~/
media/Files/PDFs%20and%20other%20files%20by%20Topic/Issues/Title%20IX/O/Offici
al%20OCR%20letter_Cheerleading.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Nat’l Coordinator of Title
IX Athletics] (discussing assessment tools as well as factors for determining whether the
OCR will consider the activity to be a “sport” for Title IX compliance evaluation).
43
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (indicating that the 2005 clarification
“included a prototype survey instrument (model survey) that institutions could use to
measure student interest”). The new clarification states that:
[S]chools in which females are underrepresented in athletics . . . and
that have not demonstrated a history and continuing practice of
expanding opportunities for [women] would be deemed in compliance
with the law under [p]rong [three] of the athletic participation
provision if they simply e-mailed a ‘model survey’ to current students
to determine their interests and abilities and found interest by the
underrepresented sex to be lacking.
Nancy Hogshead-Makar, Department of Education Creates Huge Title IX Compliance Loophole:
The Foundation Position, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND. (June 16, 2005), http://66.40.5.5/
Content/Articles/Issues/Title-IX/D/Department-of-Education-Creates-Huge-Title-IXCompliance-Loophole-The-Foundation-Position.aspx.
44
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (“[T]he 2005 Additional Clarification and
the User’s Guide . . . do not provide the appropriate and necessary clarity regarding
nondiscriminatory assessment methods, including surveys, under Part Three.”); see also
Hogshead-Makar, supra note 43 (stating that the 2005 clarification may lead to more
discrimination against women in athletics by creating a loophole for universities).
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April 2010, the ED withdrew the 2005 Additional Clarification including
the Model Survey.45 The assistant secretary of the ED stated that due to
current resource limitations and their effects on athletic departments,
there is a need to develop assessment measures that are consistent with
the nondiscrimination requirements of Title IX, while still allowing
institutions the flexibility to meet their unique circumstances.46
Under the 2010 “Dear Colleague Letter” from the ED, the “OCR
recommend[ed] that institutions have effective ongoing procedures for
collecting, maintaining, and analyzing information on the interests and
abilities of students of the underrepresented sex.”47 Surveys may be an
effective way to determine and measure the interest and abilities of the
students enrolled in a university.48 If an institution utilizes a survey to
assess the interest of its students, the content, implementation, and
response rates are considered when determining effectiveness.49 This
newest clarification from the ED allows schools to assess the interest of
students in determining Title IX compliance; it therefore provides
schools with an alternative to the substantial proportionality test.50 Since
its enactment, almost forty years ago, Title IX has evolved, has been
officially clarified, and has been applied by courts, schools, and officials
in a variety of ways resulting in its current application in which

See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (“All other Department policies . . . remain
in effect and provide the applicable standards for evaluating Part Three.”).
46
Id. The Dear Colleague letter reaffirmed and provided additional clarification on the
multiple indicators used in assessment of Title IX compliance to ensure institutions’
flexibility in developing their own assessment methods. Id.
47
See id. (indicating that procedures should include easy-to-understand policies “for
receiving and responding to requests for additional teams, and wide dissemination of such
policies . . . to existing and newly admitted students, as well as to coaches and other
employees”); see also Michelle Brutlag Hosick, OCR Rescinds 2005 Title IX Clarification,
NCAA NEWS (Apr. 20, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/Misc_Committees_DB/
CWA10/May/Supplement%20No.%2030.pdf (stating that NCAA President, Jim Ische, was
optimistic about the new clarification and its potential effect on Title IX compliance).
48
Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33. A well designed survey is one tool that may
be used to assist an institution in assessing information on students’ interests; the OCR
evaluates a survey as one component of the institution’s overall assessment under part
three and will not rely on a survey alone. Id.
49
Id. Although the OCR has not endorsed a specific survey that institutions must use, it
will evaluate the overall weight of the survey based on the following, non-exclusive
criteria: “content of the survey; target population surveyed; response rates and treatment
of non-responses; confidentiality protections; and frequency of conducting the survey.” Id.
50
See id. (explaining that the clarification allows institutions flexibility over their athletic
programs, but they must remain consistent with the nondiscriminatory Title IX
requirements).
45
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institutions rely heavily on the proportionality standard to comply with
the statute.51
B. The Evolution of Title IX
When Title IX was enacted in 1972, women’s participation in sports
was minimal, at best.52 In the first four years of its implementation,
participation in women’s athletics increased by six hundred percent to
include nearly two million participants.53 In 2008, 3.1 million girls
participated in high school athletics with an additional 182,503 women
participating in NCAA collegiate sports.54 After the implementation of
Title IX, colleges and universities across the country continued to expand
athletic opportunities for women.55 However, expanding programs is
becoming increasingly difficult due to the hard economic times.56
Schools are unable to continuously provide additional opportunities for
women and must now find alternative ways to meet the Title IX
compliance requirements.57
51
See infra Part II.B (explaining the evolution and application of Title IX since its
inception in 1972).
52
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN SPORTS TIMELINE, http://www.northnet.org/stlawrenceaauw/
timelne4.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). “When President Nixon sign[ed] the act on July 23
about 31,000 women [were] involved in college sports; spending on athletic scholarships
for women [was] less than $100,000; and the average number of women's teams at a college
[was] 2.1.” Id. “There [were] 817,073 girls participating in high school sports.” Id.
53
Starace, supra note 7, at 189.
54
U.S. Census Bureau, Women’s History Month:
March 2011, NEWSROOM,
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_edition
s/cb11-ff04.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2012).
55
See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (referencing the
improvements within Brown University to expand the athletic opportunities for women
after Title IX’s passage); see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th
Cir. 1993) (discussing growth of Colorado State University’s athletic program in the 1970s);
DENISE DEHASS, 2005–06 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT 9 (2008), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/GER06.pdf (noting that by the
2005–2006 academic year, women’s participation in college athletics had risen from fortytwo to fifty percent of total athletes).
56
See Brody Schmidt, College Sports Try to Fend Off Economic Blitz, USA TODAY (Nov. 15,
2008, 7:53 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2008-11-14-college-economy_N.htm
(noting that regardless of the size of the school, many athletic programs are getting nervous
about their financial future due to boosters and other donation sources pulling out in the
hurting economy); see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 770 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that hard economic times make it difficult for schools to expand their
women’s athletic programs, and therefore, financially-strapped institutions may still
comply with Title IX by cutting athletic programs to meet substantial proportionality).
57
See McEldowney, supra note 35 (stating that men’s teams are often eliminated
disproportionately to women’s teams and that even when women’s teams are cut alongside
men’s, the men’s roster spots are reduced in greater numbers); Mark Schlabach, Programs
Struggle to Balance Budget, ESPN (July 13, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 2 [2012], Art. 8

568

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

As a result of Title IX, women have continued to benefit from the
creation of new programs and new opportunities to compete at the
amateur level as well as the professional level through the inception of
leagues, such as the Women’s National Basketball Association
(“WNBA”) and Women’s United Soccer Association (“WUSA”).58
However, there is still evidence that there is more interest in men’s
athletics and, therefore, higher participation.59 This discrepancy in the
level of interest has led schools to comply with Title IX by contracting
and eliminating men’s sports teams.60 Compliance by contraction has
become a more common practice for athletic departments in recent years
due to the courts’ interpreting contraction as a valid form of Title IX
compliance.61
Over the last forty years, Title IX has gone from providing
opportunities for women to eliminating opportunities for men, which is
directly contrary to Title IX’s purpose of creating opportunities regardless
of sex.62 As men’s athletic teams continue to be cut due to Title IX

columns/story?columnist=schlabach_mark&id=4314195
(discussing
that
athletic
departments are struggling to balance the books after receiving less in federal funding as
well as fewer donations from alumni and boosters, and as a result, schools are resorting to
cutting programs to try and save money); see also Joe Drape, Cal-Berkeley Cuts 5 Athletic
Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/sports/29cal.
html (noting that five teams were dropped from the athletics department at the University
of California, Berkeley to save nearly $4 million per year, and two of the teams dropped,
“baseball and men’s rugby, had become particular points of pride over the years”).
58
WILLIAM H. GLOVER, JR., SPORTS LAW HANDBOOK FOR COACHES AND
ADMINISTRATORS 103 (2009). Title IX has allowed women athletes to come a long way in
the participation of athletics. Id. Also, the creation of leagues such as the WNBA and the
WUSA has allowed an increase in opportunities for women to pursue professional athletics
as a career. Id.
59
See Reich, supra note 7, at 569 (noting that desire to participate is often higher in men,
as the average men’s track team will attract thirty-two members while the corresponding
female team will attract only twenty-seven).
60
GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 64; see also id. (noting that men’s athletic teams have
become the victim of Title IX regarding compliance with the substantial proportionality
requirement because they have historically been larger and better-funded).
61
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913; see also id. (noting that compliance by
contraction is consistent with 1979 OCR interpretations of Title IX regulations, but draws
battle lines between men’s and women’s athletic teams). The court indicates that Title IX
does not require that a school continue to add money and programs into an athletic
department; it may also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark
(proportionality) by subtraction and downgrading of opportunities of the overrepresented
gender. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st. Cir. 1993).
62
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913 (noting that compliance by contraction
allows universities to take a passive solution “rather than develop creative ideas to level
the playing field” for both sexes, therefore “[t]he debate [continues] as to whether this
approach comports with the letter and spirit of Title IX”); GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 63
(“Since 1972, 256 colleges have dropped [men’s] wrestling.”); see also supra text
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compliance, more lawsuits are being filed by athletes and teams for
reverse discrimination.63 Most, if not all of these cases, have been
dismissed, and courts have ruled that eliminating men’s athletic teams
does not constitute a reverse discrimination or equal protection cause of
action.64 Courts have also ruled that Title IX, itself, is not violated by the
elimination of men’s athletic teams.65 However, as more and more teams
are cut to comply with Title IX, people are starting to question whether
men’s teams should have some recourse in the courts.66
C. Cases Under Title IX
Since its inception, Title IX has prompted many lawsuits brought by
student-athletes who feel that lack of athletic opportunities or the
elimination of athletic teams violates the statute’s compliance
Schools must show that they are providing
requirements.67
accompanying note 14 (reiterating that the purpose of Title IX is to prevent gender
discrimination in educational institutions).
63
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Title IX cases brought by eliminated men’s athletic
teams, alleging violations of Title IX compliance requirements).
64
See, e.g., Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the university’s action did not violate equal protection, and claims against the university
under § 1983 are preempted by Title IX); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272–73 (7th Cir.
1994) (ruling that the university’s decision to terminate the men’s swimming program
while retaining women’s swimming did not violate equal protection); Equity in Athletics,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 680 (W.D. Va. 2009) (ruling that regulation
implementing Title IX did not violate equal protection rights of overrepresented gender
members).
65
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“holding that Title IX does not bar universities from taking steps to ensure that women are
approximately as well represented in sports programs as they are in student bodies”);
Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639 (ruling that a university’s elimination of men’s teams based on
sex discrimination theory did not violate Title IX); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (holding that a
university’s decision to terminate the men’s swimming program while retaining women’s
swimming did not violate Title IX); Equity in Athletics, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (stating
that a university could choose to pursue gender proportionality in its athletic programs by
eliminating men’s programs, and therefore Title IX was not violated); see also Cohen, 991
F.2d at 898 (indicating that Title IX does not require that a school continue to add money
and programs into an athletic department, as it may bring itself into compliance with the
first benchmark (proportionality) by subtraction and downgrading of opportunities of the
overrepresented gender).
66
McEldowney, supra note 35. The worsening economy makes gender equity an even
more impossible hurdle; once a school determines that it must cut programs, Title IX
controls which teams will be eliminated. Id. “[A]s legal action groups and gender activists
are riding to the rescue of women’s sports, there appears to be no similar savior for men’s
athletics. Although the law promises equal protection for both sexes, . . . [officials have]
been silent on the cuts to men’s [sport] teams.” Id.
67
See generally Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 961–62 (9th Cir.
2010) (presenting a putative class action suit where female wrestlers alleged that their
exclusion from the wrestling team violated Title IX and equal protection rights); Mercer v.
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opportunities that fully and effectively address their students’ interests.68
When athletes feel that the school is not providing opportunities that
fully and effectively meet their needs, lawsuits are the most common
response, although they can be time-consuming and very expensive for
both sides.69 Almost all courts have come to the same conclusion when
evaluating Title IX compliance: Suits alleging discrimination against
women’s athletic teams have resulted in favor of the student-athletes,
while suits alleging discrimination against men’s athletic teams have
resulted in favor of the university.70 The cases outlined below, divided
into “traditional cases” and “reverse discrimination cases,” illustrate the
courts’ trend when ruling on Title IX compliance cases.71
1.

Traditional Title IX Cases

The most influential case in Title IX’s history is Cohen v. Brown
University.72 In Cohen, members of the women’s gymnastics and
Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1999) (involving a Title IX action brought by a
female student-athlete against a university for refusing to allow her to be a member of the
men’s football team); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 334 (3d. Cir. 1993) (alleging that
a university discriminated against female athletes on the basis of gender when it cut
women’s gymnastics and field hockey athletic programs); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 826 (10th Cir. 1993) (involving former members of a women’s varsity
softball team who brought a Title IX action challenging university’s cancellation of the
program); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (claiming a Title IX violation when women’s gymnastics
and volleyball teams were demoted from full varsity status to club status); see also Neal, 198
F.3d at 765 (alleging a Title IX and equal protection violation by a university for eliminating
a number of roster spots on the men’s wrestling team); Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 636
(presenting male athletes who brought claims against a university for violating Title IX and
discriminating on the basis of sex when it eliminated the men’s soccer and wrestling
programs); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267 (involving a case where athletes alleged that Title IX was
violated when the men’s swimming program was cut, but the women’s program was
retained).
68
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining Title IX compliance
requirements); see also supra notes 38 and 39 (discussing specifically the third prong of the
compliance requirements).
69
See Jill Lieber Steeg, Lawsuits, Disputes Reflect Continuing Tension Over Title IX, USA
TODAY, May 13, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-05-12-titleixcover_N.htm (noting that two lawsuits for Title IX infractions against Fresno State
University cost the school and California taxpayers more than $14 million plus interest,
which continues to accrue through the appellate process).
70
See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing the holdings of cases under Title IX, noting that
lawsuits brought by women’s athletic teams require reinstatement of teams, while men’s
actions are dismissed).
71
See infra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing Title IX court cases brought by women claiming
Title IX violations by universities, and claims by men’s teams alleging reverse
discrimination in violation of the proportionality compliance requirement).
72
991 F.2d 888; see Mansourian, 602 F.3d at 965 (quoting Cohen in determining that female
wrestlers had a claim under the fully and effectively accommodated prong of Title IX);
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volleyball teams filed suit against the university for Title IX violations
when the teams were eliminated.73 The cuts were made to comply with
the Title IX substantial proportionality requirement and to cut costs in
the athletic department.74 In assessing the school’s Title IX compliance,
the First Circuit stated that a plaintiff must “show disparity between the
gender composition of the institution’s student body and its athletic
program, thereby proving that there is an underrepresented gender.”75
The plaintiff must then show there is unmet interest, which indicates
“that the underrepresented gender has not been ‘fully and effectively
accommodated by the present program.’”76 If the plaintiff meets this
Favia, 7 F.3d at 343 (citing Cohen in discussion of the three prong test set forth by the OCR);
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 87 (D. Conn. 2010) (noting Title IX’s
history as evaluated in Cohen); see also GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 107 (noting that Cohen
is often regarded as the most influential case decided under Title IX); Reuscher, supra note
7, at 131 (stating that Cohen is viewed by many as the landmark case of Title IX).
73
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892. “The [u]niversity permitted the teams to continue playing as
‘intercollegiate clubs,’ a status that allowed them to compete against varsity teams from
other colleges,” but they would no longer have the varsity status. Id. Financial support
from the university would, however, be cut off. Id.; see also Jennifer R. Capasso, Note,
Structure Versus Effect: Revealing the Unconstitutional Operation of Title IX’s Athletics
Provisions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 825, 834 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs in Cohen represented a class
of current and future women athletes and challenged Brown University’s decision to drop
teams to reduce the financial burden in the athletic department).
74
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892. Brown’s student body consisted of approximately 48% women
and 52% men, while its athletic program consisted of 37% women and 63% men. Id. The
school stated they would save approximately $78,000 by cutting the four varsity teams
(men’s golf and water polo were also cut, though not reinstated through this action). Id. In
the 1991–1992 academic year, Brown offered fifteen women’s athletic teams and sixteen
men’s teams. Id.
75
Id. at 901. The court ruled that a Title IX violation may not be found solely due to a
disparity between gender composition of the student body and the athletic program. Id. at
895. Statistical evidence of disparity must be accompanied by further evidence of
discrimination, such as an unmet need in the underrepresented gender. Id.; see also
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 864 (stating that even before the cuts to the women’s programs,
the percentage of female athletes was far less than the percentage of female students
enrolled at Brown, therefore statistical evidence showed a violation of the first prong);
Alacbay, supra note 7, at 267 (noting that the court in Cohen ruled that there “is no specific
ratio that would automatically satisfy substantial proportionality”).
76
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902 (quoting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed.
Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The third prong of
the test sets a high, but not absolute, standard. Id. at 898. The school must be diligent in
ensuring that participatory opportunities in which “there is sufficient interest and ability
among the members of the excluded sex . . . and a reasonable expectation of intercollegiate
competition” are met. Id. (quoting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 71,418) (internal quotation marks omitted). The accommodation must be “full-andeffective,” as some accommodation will not meet the standard under Title IX. Id.; see also
Alacbay, supra note 7, at 267 (stating that the purpose of prongs two and three is to make
Title IX a vehicle by which women would become more interested in sports, and therefore
the standard is high, but not unattainable); Capasso, supra note 73, at 836 (“The court
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burden, she has proven her case, and the university is in violation of
Title IX unless it can assert an affirmative defense.77 In Cohen, the First
Circuit “ruled that a university violates Title IX if it ineffectively
accommodates student interests and abilities regardless of its
performance in other Title IX areas.”78
The Cohen court also held that a school is not required to create
teams for the underrepresented gender if that sex is demonstrably less
interested in athletics to comply with Title IX.79 However, the university
must provide gender-blind equality of athletic opportunity to its student
body.80 If a university prefers, it may bring itself into compliance with

cautioned, however, that . . . if there is sufficient interest and ability among members of the
underrepresented sex that existing programs do not satisfy, an institution [will] fail[] the
third prong of the [compliance] test.”).
77
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 902. A university may present a history and continuing practice of
program expansion for the underrepresented gender as an affirmative defense against a
Title IX action. Id. If they cannot show this history and continuation of expansion, the
institution must remain vigilant in the upgrading of competitive opportunities available to
the disadvantaged gender. Id. at 898. The school should continue “developing abilities
among the athletes of that sex until the opportunities for, and levels of, competition are
equivalent by gender.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Alacbay, supra note 7, at 268 (“[A]n institution must either prove that it has some program
in place that anticipates compliance at some specific date in the future, or prove that there
is not a sufficient unmet interest by an underrepresented gender in a specific sport.”
(footnote omitted)).
78
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 897. Even if a school meets the requirements in its allocation of
“financial assistance” and “athletic equivalence,” Title IX can be violated if the interests
and abilities of the underrepresented sex are not fully and effectively accommodated. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
79
Id. at 898. Title IX does not require that a school create teams for otherwise
disinterested students. Id. The purpose of the third prong of the three-part test is “to
determine whether a student has been ‘excluded from participation in, [or] denied the
benefits of’ an athletic program ‘on the basis of sex.’” Id. at 899–900 (alteration in original)
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006)); see also Capasso, supra note 73, at 836 (noting that
although Title IX does not require institutions to provide every athletic opportunity, it does
require an “institution to establish a new team or upgrade an existing club team if there is a
sufficiently high unmet need in the underrepresented gender”).
80
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 896. Brown violated Title IX by not “effectively accommodat[ing]
the interests and abilities of female students in the selection and level of sports.” Id.; see also
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 865 (discussing Brown’s argument that the third prong of
compliance should be satisfied using a relative interest test, which provides athletic
opportunities to women based on the ratio of interested and able women to interested and
able men, and noting that the court rejected this argument as not being gender-blind);
Capasso, supra note 73, at 836 (noting that the court’s opinion found that the university’s
interpretation of the third prong “read[s] the full out of the duty” to “fully and effectively”
accommodate its students on a gender neutral basis (internal quotation marks omitted));
Reuscher, supra note 7, at 133 (stating that based on common sense and logic, Brown
argued that the number of women enrolled at the institution was the incorrect standard
since women and men often do not share an equal interest in sports, but the court
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the first benchmark of the three-part test by reducing opportunities for
the overrepresented sex.81 Because Brown University did not meet any
of the standards in the three-part test, it was in violation of Title IX, and
therefore the women’s teams were required to be reinstated to full
varsity status.82
This case was the first of its kind to determine how Title IX applied
to women in athletic situations.83 By ruling that universities must
provide equal opportunities for both genders and that the
proportionality requirement could be met by subtraction, schools were
able to comply with Title IX by cutting men’s teams if they were unable
to add women’s teams.84 The outcome has been relied on by many other
courts in Title IX actions throughout the years.85
dismissed this argument stating that “no person could continuously keep track and
summarize ‘students [sic] interests and abilities’”).
81
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898–99. The fact that the overrepresented gender is not “fully and
effectively” accommodated does not excuse the lack of opportunities provided for the
underrepresented sex. Id. at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also COZZILLIO ET
AL., supra note 36, at 913 (noting that compliance by contraction is consistent with the 1979
OCR interpretations of the Title IX regulations, but draws battle lines between men’s and
women’s athletic teams, and also acknowledging that compliance by contraction allows
universities to take a passive solution rather than “develop creative ideas to level the
playing field” for both sexes).
82
Cohen, 991 F.2d at 907. Brown did not even closely meet the “substantial
proportionality” test under prong one. Id. at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Brown could show “impressive growth” in the 1970s, it had not added a
women’s team in nearly twenty years, and therefore did not meet the second prong of the
Title IX requirement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Also, there would be a waste
of great interest and talent if women’s volleyball and gymnastics were eliminated,
therefore failing to meet the third prong of the test. See id. at 904 (recognizing that women’s
volleyball and gymnastics would have fewer players and become less competitive if given
club status, rather than varsity status); Capasso, supra note 73, at 837 (noting that the Cohen
court held that “Title IX [was] not an affirmative action statute, but rather an antidiscrimination statute, and that no aspect of the Title IX regime mandates gender-based
preferences or quotas”).
83
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 891 (noting that this was a “watershed case” in which there was
some confusion as to Title IX’s application to college athletics); Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 864
(noting that “by its own description and any objective measure,” Cohen is considered the
“‘watershed’ decision about equal athletic opportunity”); Capasso, supra note 73, at 834
(designating the Cohen decision as the “‘[w]atershed’ [i]nterpretation” of Title IX).
84
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (acknowledging that Title IX does not require a school to
pour infinite funds into its athletic department to accommodate all needs, as a school may
comply by downgrading or reducing opportunities for the overrepresented gender while
keeping opportunities for the underrepresented gender stable).
85
See generally Mansourian v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Cohen in determining that female wrestlers had a claim under the fully and
effectively accommodated prong of Title IX); Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th
Cir. 1999) (prohibiting the university from discriminating against a student on the basis of
her sex once it allowed her to try out for the football team); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d
332, 344 (3d. Cir. 1993) (requiring the university to reinstate women’s varsity field hockey
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The same year Cohen was decided, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that Indiana University of Pennsylvania (“IUP”) had to
reinstate its women’s field hockey and gymnastics teams to comply with
Title IX in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania.86 The court affirmed
the district court’s order, which determined that IUP did not meet any of
the three prongs of the Title IX compliance test, especially substantial
proportionality, and therefore could not eliminate women’s teams.87 IUP
tried to substitute women’s soccer for women’s gymnastics after the
preliminary injunction was granted, but the court ruled that although
women’s soccer would increase the proportionality of the athletic
department, the spending would be much less.88 This case provided that
unequal aggregate expenditures would be considered in assessing
equality of opportunities for each sex.89
Mercer v. Duke University,90 which was decided in 1999, determined
that where a member of the excluded sex is allowed to try out for a
and gymnastics programs to comply with Title IX); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F.
Supp. 2d 62, 87–92 (D. Conn. 2010) (discussing Title IX’s history as evaluated in Cohen).
86
See Favia, 7 F.3d at 344 (affirming a preliminary injunction granted by the district
court, which required IUP to reinstate women’s varsity field hockey and gymnastics
programs); see also Reuscher, supra note 7, at 135–36 (noting that the court entered judgment
for the plaintiff “and ordered the restoration of the women’s teams back to varsity status”).
87
Favia, 7 F.3d at 335–36. The student body of IUP was 56% women and 44% men, while
athletic participation was 38% women and 62% men. Id. at 335. The court ruled that IUP
had failed to provide equal athletic opportunities to female students and therefore was in
violation of Title IX. Id. at 336. Prior to this action, IUP offered nine men’s and women’s
varsity athletic teams; however the men’s teams were much larger. Id. at 335. Due to the
disproportionate number of participants, IUP was in violation of Title IX. Id. at 336.
88
Id. at 336. The school already had plans to elevate its women’s club soccer team to
varsity status, which would increase the percentage of women participating in sports to
forty-three percent. Id. The athletic director also noted that soccer would follow the
national trend toward women’s participation in soccer and away from gymnastics, and
would increase recruiting of future athletes. Id. The court also noted that replacing
gymnastics, which requires a $150,000 investment with soccer, which requires only $50,000,
would decrease the overall expenditures for women’s athletics. Id. at 343; see also Jill K.
Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of the
Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 553, 579 (1994) (“Two months after the preliminary
injunction [was] issued, IUP sought to modify the order by substituting a women’s soccer
team for the women’s gymnastics team.”); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 311 (discussing IUP’s
argument for modification of the injunction, stating that it would allow the school to make
progress in achieving proportionality while increasing recruitment options for the future).
89
Favia, 7 F.3d at 343. “[U]nequal aggregate expenditures for members of male and
female teams will not necessarily establish noncompliance” with Title IX. Id. However, the
“failure to provide funds . . . [to] one sex may be considered in assessing [the] equality of
opportunit[ies].” Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 88, at 579–80 (noting that a fifty-member
soccer team, costing $50,000, would bring the university closer to proportionality
compliance than a fifteen-member gymnastics team costing $150,000; however, the court
denied the motion to amend because expenditures would be less for women’s athletics).
90
190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
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historically one-gendered sport, the university could not discriminate on
the basis of sex in allowing the athlete to play on the team.91 Title IX
provides that a university may provide gender-segregated teams if the
sport is a contact sport or if selection for the team is based upon
competitive skill.92 However, where there is no comparable team,
“members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team
offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.”93 The court ruled
that members of the excluded sex need not be allowed to try out for a
contact sport, but if the institution and team allows them to try-out, the
athlete may not be discriminated against based on sex.94
Although these traditional Title IX cases have shaped the
interpretation of the statute by courts, they are not the only cases
involving discrimination claims under Title IX.95 Men’s athletic teams
that have been cut to allow universities to comply with the substantial

91
Id. at 648. Because Duke allowed Mercer to try out for its football team, and made her
a member of the team for a period of time, the team was not allowed to discriminate
against her solely on the basis of sex. Id.; see also Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty
Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551, 563 (2003) (“Title IX regulations permit the
operation of separate sex teams . . . when participation is based on competitive skill or
when the team competes in a ‘contact’ sport.”).
92
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2009). “[An institution] may operate or sponsor separate teams
for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or
the activity involved is a contact sport.” Id.; see also Mercer, 190 F.3d at 646 (noting that
institutions are allowed “to operate separate teams for men and women in many sports,
including contact sports such as football, rather than integrating those teams”); Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that “athletic program[s] may consist
of gender-segregated teams as long as” the sport is either a contact sport or there is a
comparable team for each gender).
93
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
94
Mercer, 190 F.3d at 647–48. The court stated that the text of the clause is incomplete in
that it states that a member of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out as long as the
sport is not a contact sport, but it gives no indication of what the requirement is for a
contact sport. Id. at 647. The court read the rule to say “members of the excluded sex must
be allowed to try out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport, in
which case members of the excluded sex need not be allowed to try out.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court concluded by saying that since Duke University allowed Mercer
to try out for a historically gender-segregated sport, it could not discriminate against her
after the fact. Id. at 648; see also Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Contact Sports Exemption:
Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381, 395 (2000) (noting that the
Fourth Circuit held “that while Title IX’s contact sports exception would have allowed
Duke to exclude Mercer from the team despite her abilities, once she was allowed on the
team, she could not be discriminated against on the basis of her sex”).
95
See infra Part II.C.2 (presenting other cases involving discrimination claims under Title
IX); supra Part II.C.1 (highlighting the holdings in traditional Title IX cases).
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proportionality test have started bringing actions based on Title IX
infringement and equal protection violations.96
2.

Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX

Suits brought under Title IX have traditionally involved a challenge
to a university for violating compliance requirements when the
university eliminated women’s athletic teams.97 However, the trend is
changing and more men are alleging violations under Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause for cuts to men’s athletic teams.98 The first
significant reverse discrimination suit was decided in 1994 in Kelley v.
Board of Trustees.99 In Kelley, members of the men’s swimming program
at the University of Illinois brought a Title IX and reverse discrimination
action when the team was eliminated from the athletic department.100 In
determining the regulations for Title IX, Congress did not require
schools to have parallel teams for each gender; therefore, cuts to the
athletic department could be gender-based to meet substantial
proportionality.101 Congress has the broad power to remedy past
96
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing cases brought by men’s athletic teams who assert that
cutting men’s teams to comply with Title IX’s proportionality requirement is essentially
gender discrimination and a Title IX violation).
97
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Title IX cases brought by women’s athletic teams
claiming Title IX violations).
98
See generally Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999)
(presenting a men’s athletic team that claimed that a university’s reducing the number of
roster spots on its men’s wrestling team violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX);
Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1999) (asserting that elimination of
the men’s soccer and wrestling teams at Illinois State University programs violated Title IX
and sex discrimination under § 1983); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994)
(alleging violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause when the men’s swimming
program was terminated at the University of Illinois); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (W.D. Va. 2009) (claiming that Title IX regulations, which
imposed gender equality in federally financed programs and resulted in the elimination of
athletic teams, were unconstitutional).
99
35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
100
Id. at 267. The University of Illinois determined it would only field teams that were
capable of competing for Big Ten Titles and NCAA championships. Id. at 269. The school
selected the swimming program for elimination because of its history of weak performance
and lack of spectator following. Id. The university did not, however, eliminate the
women’s swimming program for fear of violating Title IX. Id. At the time of the lawsuit,
the University of Illinois’s student body consisted of 44% women and 56% men, while its
athletic program consisted of 23% women and 67% men. Id.; see also Capasso, supra note 73,
at 838 (noting that male swimmers “sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the
university from cutting their program while leaving the female swimming program
intact”); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 314 (noting that the court “was sympathetic to the
unfortunate loss of men’s opportunities from the implementation of Title IX”).
101
Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271. The OCR “could have required schools to sponsor a women’s
program for every men’s program offered and vice versa.” Id. This method of ensuring
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discrimination, thus men cannot claim a Title IX violation for lack of full
and effective accommodation if the proportionality requirement is still in
their favor.102 Therefore, the Kelley court ruled that the men’s team did
not have a valid cause of action under Title IX or the Equal Protection
Clause.103
Five years after Kelley was decided, the Seventh Circuit again
decided a case involving alleged reverse discrimination and a Title IX
violation when men’s teams were cut from an athletic department in
Boulahanis v. Board of Regents.104 In Boulahanis, former members of the
men’s soccer and wrestling teams claimed that the elimination of men’s
teams denied them “equal athletic opportunity” under Title IX.105 The
cuts were a response to a Title IX compliance investigation done by the

equality among teams would undoubtedly have been the easiest to comply with, but
requiring such a rigid approach would deny schools the flexibility to respond to men’s and
women’s differing interests in athletics. Id. The substantial proportionality benchmark
provides schools with a clear way to establish compliance, and men’s teams may be cut
based on gender to meet the requirements. Id.; see also Heckman, supra note 91, at 563
(noting that Title IX regulations did not require separate, parallel teams for each gender
and “the operation of separate sex teams . . . when participation is based on competitive
skill or when the team competes in a ‘contact’ sport” was acceptable).
102
Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272. Removing the legacy of sexual discrimination, including
discrimination in athletics, is an important government objective; therefore, the court must
give deference to Congress in remedying this discrimination. Id. Men’s participation in
athletics at the university, even after the elimination of the swimming program, was
proportionately higher than that of their female counterparts. Id. at 270. “[I]f the
percentage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially proportionate to the
percentage of students of that sex in the general student population, the athletic interests of
that sex are presumed to have been accommodated.” Id.; see also Jurewitz, supra note 7, at
314 (stating that the court held that “the law permits discriminatory remedial measures
provided that they are substantially related to prohibiting gender discrimination”);
Reuscher, supra note 7, at 137 (noting that “even though the elimination of the program
excluded [plaintiffs] from varsity participation as individuals, the percentage of all men
participating in the varsity program [was] more than substantially proportionate to the
percentage of men represented by the undergraduate population” and, therefore, Title IX
was not violated (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103
Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272–73. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
university. Id. at 267. The district court correctly ruled that the University of Illinois did
not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause in its decision to terminate the men’s
swimming team. Id. at 272–73.
104
198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999). The court stated that the plaintiff-appellants’ argument
was substantially similar to that already considered in Kelley. Id. at 637.
105
Id. at 635. The court stated that unless the judicial system is willing to mandate
spending by universities to increase opportunities for the underrepresented sex, the OCR’s
proportionality rule must be read to allow the elimination of men’s athletic teams to
achieve Title IX compliance. Id. at 638; see also Catherine Pieronek, Title IX Beyond Thirty: A
Review of Recent Developments, 30 J.C. & U.L. 75, 103 (2003) (noting that because of the
difficulty in distinguishing decisions made solely due to financial reasons from those made
to comply with Title IX, the Seventh Circuit refused to distinguish Boulahanis from Kelley).
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Gender Equity Committee, which found the school to be in violation of
the statute.106 The court ruled that “the elimination of men’s athletic
programs [was] not a violation of Title IX as long as men’s participation
in athletics continues to be ‘substantially proportionate’ to their
enrollment.”107
The men’s teams argued that if Title IX is interpreted to permit the
elimination of men’s teams solely on the basis of sex, the Equal
Protection Clause would be violated.108 However, the court, following
Kelley, ruled that Title IX’s objective to prohibit discrimination in the
historically underrepresented gender is accomplished by pursuing
substantial proportionality.109 Neither Title IX nor the Equal Protection
Clause is violated by the elimination of men’s teams to comply with the
Title IX proportionality requirement.110
106
Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 635. In the fall of 1993, the Gender Equity Committee of Illinois
State University began a year-long investigation into Title IX compliance at the school. Id.
The committee found that the university’s student body consisted of 45% males and 55%
females, while the athletic participation was 66% men and 34% women. Id. The school had
not added a women’s athletic team in over ten years and did not believe that it could fully
and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the female student-body;
therefore, the school decided to focus on the substantial proportionality requirement. Id.
The university began finding ways to comply with Title IX and eventually decided to
eliminate men’s wrestling and soccer, add women’s soccer, and reduce men’s roster spots
on other teams. Id. at 636. This adjustment changed the athletic participation ratio to 52%
women and 48% men. Id.; see also Pieronek, supra note 105, at 103 (“Because [ISU] has
achieved substantial proportionality between men’s enrollment and men’s participation in
athletics, it is presumed to have accommodated [men’s] athletic interests.” (alterations in
original)).
107
Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 638. The court also noted, as it did in Kelley, that if a university
has achieved substantial proportionality between men’s enrollment and athletics, it is
presumed to have accommodated the athletic interests of that sex. Id.
108
Id. at 639; see also Pieronek, supra note 105, at 103 (quoting Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639)
(noting that the students “argu[ed] that they [had] a protected property interest in
participating in athletics” and cutting the team would violate the Equal Protection Clause,
and the court dismissed the action after recognizing that Title IX preempted equal
protection claims (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109
Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639. The purpose of Title IX “is not to ensure that the athletic
opportunities available to women increase. Rather its avowed purpose is to prohibit
educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex.” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Bd.
of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The elimination
of the men’s soccer and wrestling teams by the university “were substantially related” to
achieving this objective and complying with Title IX’s proportionality requirement. Id.; see
also Pieronek, supra note 105, at 104 (noting that in providing remedies under Title IX,
Congress created a regime of redress of sex discrimination in athletics).
110
Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 639. The court reflected its holding in Kelley and stated that
“[w]hile the effect of Title IX and the relevant regulation and policy interpretation is that
institutions will sometimes consider gender when decreasing their athletic offerings, this
limited consideration of sex does not violate the Constitution” or Title IX. Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In Neal v. Board of Trustees,111 decided the same year as Boulahanis, the
Ninth Circuit Court held that the university’s decision to reduce roster
spots available to male athletes, to remedy imbalance between genders,
did not violate Title IX.112 The cuts to the men’s wrestling program were
made in compliance with a previous lawsuit in which the California
State University system was found to be violating Title IX’s
proportionality requirement.113 The district court granted a preliminary
injunction preventing the reductions, stating that capping men’s teams to
comply with Title IX violated the statute as a matter of law.114 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, stating
that Title IX was not violated when the university cut opportunities for
the overrepresented gender.115
The men argued that equal opportunity is best achieved when each
gender’s athletic participation roughly matches its interest in
participating.116 However, the court ruled that basing compliance on
198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 770. A university may “comply with Title IX by leveling down programs instead
of ratcheting them up” to ensure substantial proportionality. Id. The court stated that
“Title IX does not bar universities from taking steps to ensure that women are
approximately as well represented in sports programs as they are in student bodies,” and
therefore cuts to men’s athletic teams were not prohibited. Id. at 773; see also Danielle M.
Ganzi, Note, After the Commission: The Government’s Inadequate Responses to Title IX’s
Negative Effect on Men’s Intercollegiate Athletics, 84 B.U. L. REV. 543, 553 (2004) (noting that
the court acknowledged that “the Policy Interpretation [of Title IX compliance] simply
creates a presumption . . . that a school has violated Title IX if there is a statistical disparity
between the sexes in their athletic program”).
113
Neal, 198 F.3d at 765. Female students made up 64% of the student body at California
State University, Bakersfield (“CSUB”), but only represented 39% of the athletic
population. Id. In response to a lawsuit filed by the National Organization for Women,
CSUB agreed to adjust athletic participation to within five percentage points of the student
enrollment. Id. At the time, “California was slowly emerging from a recession, and state
funding . . . was declining,” creating a problem for schools that wished to expand
opportunities. Id. CSUB adopted “squad size targets” to comply with Title IX by reducing
the size of men’s teams across the board, instead of eliminating entire men’s teams. Id.
114
Id. at 766. “The district court concluded as a matter of fact that CSUB’s primary
motivation for capping the size of the men’s teams was to meet the gender proportionality
requirements in the consent decree.” Id. It ruled that, as a matter of law, capping men’s
teams violated Title IX. Id.; see also Capasso, supra note 73, at 839 (noting that the district
court granted the preliminary injunction in favor of the male athletes by ruling that the
gender-based distinction in implementing cuts created a quota system, which was a
violation of Title IX).
115
Neal, 198 F.3d at 765; see also Ganzi, supra note 112, at 553 (stating that “the Ninth
Circuit found that the district court had not deferred sufficiently to the Policy
Interpretation” issued by the OCR regarding Title IX compliance).
116
Neal, 198 F.3d at 767. “Appellees therefore suggest that gender-conscious remedies
are appropriate only when necessary to ensure that schools provide opportunities to males
and females in proportion to their relative levels of interest in sports participation.” Id.
The court stated that male athletes have been given an enormous head start in athletics,
111
112
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interest instead of composition of enrollment would ignore the fact that
Title IX was enacted to remedy discrimination that results from gender
stereotyped notions about women’s interests and abilities.117 Every court
that has ruled on Title IX violations “has held that a university may bring
itself into Title IX compliance by [either] increasing athletic opportunities
for
the
underrepresented
gender . . . or . . . decreasing
athletic
opportunities for the overrepresented gender.”118 Therefore, Title IX was
not violated by the reduction in men’s roster spots to achieve substantial
proportionality.119
Finally, Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education is the most
recent case involving Title IX violations and reverse discrimination in the
elimination of men’s teams.120 In Equity in Athletics, an association of
sports participants, coaches, and fans sued the ED claiming a Title IX
violation.121 The lawsuit focused on James Madison University’s
(“JMU”) decision to cut ten athletic teams from the athletic department
to comply with Title IX.122 The court held that Title IX should not be
and therefore Title IX “prompt[s] universities to level the proverbial playing field.” Id.; see
also Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 865 (noting that the court in Cohen ruled that the third prong
of compliance “may require a university ‘to give the underrepresented gender . . . a larger
slice of a shrinking athletic-opportunity pie’” (quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,
906 (1st Cir. 1993))).
117
Neal, 198 F.3d at 768. The central aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage
women to participate in sports, but basing compliance on stereotypes of women’s interests
does not allow that purpose to grow. Id. Title IX must be viewed as a dynamic statute that
adjusts with the “continuing progress toward the goal of equal opportunity for all
athletes.” Id. at 769.
118
Id. at 769–70; see id. at 770 (citing cases that recognize that institutions experiencing
financial difficulties may have to resort to reducing the number of opportunities where it is
impractical to increase opportunities).
119
Id. at 773. A university must provide athletic opportunities in proportion to the
gender composition of the student body and this can be achieved “by increasing . . .
opportunities for the underrepresented gender . . . or by decreasing opportunities . . . for
the overrepresented gender.” Id. at 770; see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913
(noting that compliance by contraction is consistent with 1979 OCR interpretations of the
Title IX regulations); Benedetto, supra note 35 (“Under Title IX, there must be
proportionality between men’s and women’s teams based on the total enrollment at the
school.”).
120
675 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D. Va. 2009).
121
Id. at 667. The primary purpose for James Madison University’s (“JMU”) decision to
cut teams was to bring the school into compliance with Title IX. Id. The Equity in Athletics
Association (“EIA”) challenged the Title IX interpretive guidelines that permit colleges to
engage in the kind of gender-based decision making that Title IX was intended to prevent.
Id.
122
Id. at 666. In 2006, JMU decided to cut ten varsity athletic teams to bring itself into
Title IX compliance. Id. The teams that were cut included men’s archery, cross-country,
gymnastics, indoor track, outdoor track, swimming, and wrestling, as well as women’s
archery, fencing, and gymnastics. Id. At the time of the cuts, JMU consisted of 61% women
and 39% men within the student body and 51% women and 49% men in the athletic
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interpreted to require proportionality between athletics and general
enrollment, but the statute authorizes institutions to comply in such a
manner.123 Therefore, Title IX is not violated when opportunities for the
overrepresented sex are decreased based on gender.124
“To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must [show] sufficient
facts to ‘demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others’” in
a similar situation and the treatment must be “‘the result of intentional
or purposeful discrimination.’”125 The court ruled that JMU made
gender-based cuts to ensure compliance with a federal law and not with
the intention of discriminating against one sex.126 Therefore, JMU’s

department. Id. After the cuts, the ratio of women participating in athletics would mimic
that of enrollment (61% women and 39% men). Id. at 667.
123
Id. at 670. The first prong of the three-part compliance test authorizes, rather than
requires, schools to engage in gender balancing to comply with Title IX. Id. Although the
statute does not require proportionality, it does not forbid it either. Id.; see also Capasso,
supra note 73, at 836 (noting that although Title IX does not require institutions to provide
every athletic opportunity, it does “require[] an academic institution to establish a new
team or upgrade an existing club team if there is a sufficiently high unmet need in the
underrepresented gender”).
124
Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 672. In determining how an institution will
comply with Title IX, it may sometimes consider gender when decreasing its athletic
program, but such limited consideration does not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. Id.
125
Id. at 679–80 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams v. Hansen, 326 F.3d 569, 576 (4th
Cir. 2003)). A plaintiff must present proof in the form of “sufficient facts to demonstrate
that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that
the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams, 326 F.3d at 576) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (stating
that equal protection requires “that the [g]overnment must treat citizens as individuals, not
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class” (quoting Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995))); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464
(1979) (noting that disparate impact and foreseeable consequences are relevant to prove an
equal protection claim); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(discussing equal protection claims in a school desegregation case and noting that equal
protection of law is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); Richard A. Primus, Equal
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 514 (2003) (noting that
motive is often a factor when determining whether there is a valid equal protection claim);
A Brief History of School Desegregation, AUSTIN CHRON. (June 10, 2005),
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2005-06-10/274239/ (discussing equal protection
as it applies to school desegregation).
126
Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 680. The university’s actions were taken in an
attempt to comply with the requirements of Title IX and therefore were not considered
“intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Williams, 326
F.3d at 576); see also Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory Purpose?, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 837, 840 (2011) (noting that in Ricci v. DeStefano, decided in 2009, the government’s
“ultimate aim . . . was to comply with [a] federal law” even though the actions were “race
dependant in the sense that its actions likely would have been different but for the race of
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decision to cut athletic teams to comply with Title IX proportionality
requirements did not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause.127
The differences in the outcome of traditional Title IX cases and the
new reverse discrimination cases show that the courts are focused on
remedying past discrimination against women, rather than the equality
principle of Title IX.128 An in-depth look at the downfalls of Title IX’s
current application—as well as an analysis of the proportionality and
fully and effectively accommodated prongs of the compliance test—
shows that a change is necessary if Title IX’s goal of protecting all
athletic participants, regardless of gender, is to be achieved.129
III. ANALYSIS
This Part analyzes the Title IX statute, focusing primarily on the
“proportionality” and “fully and effectively accommodated” compliance
Part III.A discusses
requirements under the three-prong test.130
problems with the evolution and application of Title IX’s three-prong
compliance requirement test.131 Part III.B examines the proportionality
requirement of Title IX compliance by analyzing the statute itself along
with the courts’ interpretations of the requirement.132 Finally, Part III.C
discusses the fully and effectively accommodated prong of the
compliance requirements by analyzing the statutory language and the
courts’ interpretations of this compliance prong.133
A. Shortcomings in Title IX’s Evolution and Application
When Title IX was enacted forty years ago, the purpose was to
prohibit discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of

those benefited or disadvantaged by it,” and the court invalidated such an action, ruling it
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny review (internal quotation marks omitted)).
127
Equity in Athletics, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 672. Due to previous decisions regarding reverse
discrimination and equal protection, the court chose to follow the trend and held that the
plaintiff did not state a cause of action; therefore, the university was not prohibited from
eliminating teams based on gender. Id.
128
See supra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing Title IX cases and the courts’ trends to rule in favor
of female athletic teams and against men’s teams).
129
See infra Part III (analyzing Title IX’s language and compliance requirements, as well
as the problems caused by the current application of Title IX).
130
See infra Parts III.A–C (analyzing Title IX and its compliance requirements while
discussing the positive and negative effects resulting from the statute’s enactment).
131
See infra Part III.A (examining Title IX’s negative effect on athletic departments due to
its current application).
132
See infra Part III.B (discussing the proportionality requirement under Title IX).
133
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the fully and effectively accommodated prong of the
Title IX compliance standards).
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gender.134 This was interpreted to mean creating opportunities for
women where there previously were very few opportunities, such as in
athletics.135 The statute has accomplished that goal, as there are more
opportunities for women now than ever before.136 This may be one
reason why institutions have a hard time complying with the second
prong of the Title IX compliance standards, which requires showing a
history and continuation of creating opportunities for the
underrepresented gender.137 In today’s society, women have arguably
the same opportunities as men throughout their development, especially
when it comes to athletics.138 At some point, athletic programs may have
no additional opportunities to offer; therefore, continued expansion is
nearly impossible.139
As currently applied, Title IX has come full circle and now creates
discrimination solely on the basis of sex due to the application of the
compliance requirements, which have many schools cutting men’s sports
teams to meet the proportionality standard.140 Where Title IX was once a
statute that focused on creating opportunities, it has now become a
statute that is reducing opportunities for men based solely on their

134
See supra notes 14, 21 and accompanying text (discussing Title IX’s enactment and
purpose).
135
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); see H.R. REP. NO. 96-459, at 35 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1612, 1614 (stating that the purpose for the Educational Amendments is to
promote the general welfare of the United Sates); S. REP. NO. 96-49, at 10–11 (1979),
reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1514, 1524–25 (noting that the need for equal access to
educational activities is paramount; Title IX is specifically designed to help end sex
discrimination); see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that
removing the legacy of sexual discrimination, including discrimination in athletics, is an
important government objective, and therefore the court must give deference to Congress
in remedying this discrimination).
136
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (noting the increase in women’s
participation in sports, also showing that more women are participating in sports now than
ever before).
137
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (“[I]n light of the thirty [plus] years since
Title IX’s passage, it is difficult for [a school] to boast a history and continuing practice of
program expansion for women if the school still does not provide proportionally equal
opportunities for both sexes.”).
138
See GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 103 (noting that Title IX has allowed women athletes
to come a long way in the participation of athletics as adolescents, as well as in colleges and
in the creation of professional leagues); see also DEHASS, supra note 55, at 9 (stating that
female athletes account for fifty percent of student-athletes in Division I, non-football
schools, forty-one percent of student-athletes in Division II, and forty-two percent of
Division III).
139
See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties with
continued expansion of athletic programs to provide additional opportunities for women).
140
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing reverse discrimination cases in which men’s teams
bring claims against universities for Title IX violations when teams are cut).
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gender.141 The spirit in which Title IX was enacted would be better
achieved if opportunities were offered on the basis of competitiveness,
interest, and feasibility, instead of the ratio of student-athletes by
gender.142 The purpose of Title IX has been discarded in lieu of a quota
system that requires universities to provide opportunities to studentathletes, which are determined by gender instead of interest or
competitiveness.143
The current system of Title IX compliance has some positive effects
as well as some drawbacks.144 The three-prong test that is used to
determine compliance gives institutions multiple options, which they
can use to determine how they will comply with the statute.145 Allowing
schools to have more than one means of adhering to Title IX gives
institutions flexibility, and therefore provides the opportunity for higher
compliance rates.146 Also, the current system has been around for forty

See Robertson, supra note 7, at 307 (noting that from 1981–2001, men lost between
57,100–57,700 participation opportunities, while in the same time period, women gained
roughly 52,000 opportunities); compare H.R. REP. NO. 96-459, at 35 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1612, 1614 (stating that the purpose of Title IX is to prohibit educational
institutions from giving preferential or different treatment to members based on sex), with
Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 769–70 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that cutting
a men’s wrestling team does not violate Title IX because compliance is presumed in
overrepresented gender even when teams are cut), Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d
633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that as long as proportionality of athletic opportunities
shows an overrepresented gender, that gender is presumed to be fully and effectively
accommodated), and Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the
elimination of the swimming team did not violate Title IX because men’s participation in
athletics remained substantially proportionate).
142
See Alacbay, supra note 7, at 269 (discussing how capping and cuts hurt the overall
competitive nature of athletic teams and the school as a whole, and that there is a double
standard when schools make a gender-conscious decision toward a men’s team); see also
McErlain, supra note 35 (discussing the practice of “roster management” and the problems
it causes for coaches, teams, and the competitive nature of the sport in general (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
143
See Reich, supra note 7, at 569 (noting that even though men’s interest in athletics
outweighs that of their female counterparts, men’s teams are still cut to comply with
proportionality); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (noting that the proportionality standard
gives universities little choice for compliance and therefore imposes a quota system); see
also McErlain, supra note 35 (discussing the problems roster management causes for
coaches, teams, and the competitive nature of the sport in general).
144
See infra notes 145–54 and accompanying text (discussing the positives and negatives
of the current Title IX three-prong compliance test).
145
See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text (examining the OCR regulations, which
set out the three prong test, and how each of the prongs can be utilized to comply with
Title IX).
146
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905 (discussing Title IX compliance and how
each of the different prongs may be satisfied, and also noting that universities choose to use
different methods when determining compliance).
141
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years; thus, institutions understand what is required under Title IX.147
Courts have continuously applied the standards in similar ways and the
interpretations have given universities direction in how to remain
compliant.148
The OCR Clarifications—which have been issued to try to remedy
reverse discrimination claims and allow institutions to comply with Title
IX by evaluating and accommodating the interest of the university—
have been unsuccessful and created more problems.149 There are no
clear standards for evaluating the level of interest within the school, the
surrounding community, and the athletic department, making
assessment of interest a near impossibility for universities.150 Even
worse, if a school is able to adequately assess interest, there is no
direction for applying its findings to an athletic department to comply
with Title IX and save itself from costly litigation in the future.151 Finally,
the OCR has never set a standard for how often interest must be
assessed, and therefore, how long an institution would be in compliance
if it could meet this difficult standard.152 The clarifications have created
more problems for institutions and courts who must decide if a school
has fully and effectively accommodated the underrepresented gender in
its athletic offerings.153 Therefore, reliance on the proportionality
standards has become a way to ensure Title IX compliance.154
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 828–29 (discussing the history of Title IX and the
compliance regulations set forth by the OCR); Hatlevig, supra note 7, at 90–97 (outlining the
three prongs set forth by the OCR and how they can be applied by institutions to achieve
compliance); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 290–91 (discussing the framework of Title IX
compliance and its application to athletics); Reuscher, supra note 7, at 119–29 (discussing
the three prong test and its application and interpretation regarding Title IX compliance).
148
See supra text accompanying note 70 (highlighting that courts traditionally rule in
favor of women’s sports teams in Title IX claims, applying the proportionality standard
consistently to actions).
149
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 840–46 (highlighting problems created by the Model
Survey, which was issued in the 2005 Clarification by the OCR to further assess interest
under the third prong of the compliance test).
150
See id. (evaluating the subjective nature of the third prong and how a lack of standards
creates uncertainty for schools); see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (noting that the
proportionality standard gives universities little choice for compliance and therefore
imposes a quota system).
151
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 840–46 (describing the uncertainty caused by the third
prong); Robertson, supra note 7, at 309 (noting that an alternative approach may be
necessary due to a lack of objective direction and the result of women’s and men’s sports
being pitted against each other).
152
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 840–41 (noting that problems created from the Model
Survey have gone unanswered by the OCR, including response rates and frequency of
administering the survey).
153
See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (ruling that when there is
sufficient interest and ability among the members of the underrepresented sex and a team
147
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The application of the current Title IX compliance requirements can
be compared to other areas of social change where remedying past
discrimination has caused other forms of equal protection claims.155 The
current problems in Title IX’s application parallel school desegregation
cases, in which laws were passed to remedy past racial discrimination by
forcing schools to desegregate and prohibit “separate but equal”
educational institutions.156 However, it has recently been argued that
forcing racial integration is equally as unconstitutional as racial
segregation.157 Laws that require racial or gender based actions may be
invalid even if they are designed to avoid disparate impact liability or
remedy past discrimination.158 The current Title IX compliance system
causes a disparate impact on men’s athletics—similar to the disparate
impact laws involving racial classifications—and therefore should
trigger an equal protection cause of action.159 Since courts do not

is being eliminated, it is assumed that the institution is not fully and effectively
accommodating that sex); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (noting that “it is
difficult for a college to defend its lack of proportional opportunities by arguing that it has
fully accommodated women’s interests and abilities” when there are Title IX compliance
complaints).
154
See infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing proportionality as the “safe
harbor” of compliance).
155
See Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that remedying past
discrimination is an important government interest; therefore, if the proportionality of
athletes favors the overrepresented gender, they will be presumed to be accommodated);
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007) (stating
that equal protection requires “that the [g]overnment must treat citizens as individuals, not
as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class”); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (discussing equal protection claims in a school
desegregation case and noting that equal protection of law is guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment).
156
See A Brief History of School Desegregation, supra note 125 (noting that “separate but
equal” laws were passed in 1896, but were then repealed in 1954 in Brown v. Board of
Education); see also Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (noting that the OCR did not require parallel teams
for men’s and women’s sports, but that solution would have been an easy way to ensure
Title IX compliance).
157
See Adams, supra note 126, at 883 (noting that recently the Supreme Court has adopted
an “equivalence doctrine,” which states “that there is a moral [and] constitutional
equivalence between laws designed to” segregate and those designed to integrate
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158
See id. at 840 (discussing the Court’s ruling in Ricci and noting that even if the actions
were intended to avoid disparate impact, the action may still qualify as “race-based,” and
therefore would be invalid (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (noting that disparate impact and foreseeable
consequences are relevant evidence to prove an equal protection claim).
159
See Primus, supra note 125, at 538 (noting that disparate impact standards trigger
heightened scrutiny in equal protection claims); id. at 515 (discussing Title VII disparate
impact law as applied to racial classifications); see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Title IX
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recognize such a claim in men’s athletic teams, changes to the current
regulations should be used to remedy this problem.160
The question then arises, what is the best standard to achieve
equality in college athletics? The answer is not as simple as picking one
of the standards set forth in the three-prong test.161 To assess true
equality of opportunities, a combination of these standards may be
necessary.162 Both the proportionality and the fully and effectively
accommodated standards have drawbacks in their language and
application, but a combination of the two prongs may be the best way to
satisfy all parties.163 Adequately assessing the interest in the athletics
department and applying a standard that allows schools to offer
opportunities that are proportionate to this level of interest would create
a win-win situation.164
B. Title IX’s Proportionality Requirement
Schools most often choose to comply with Title IX by adhering to the
proportionality standard of the three-prong compliance test.165 This is
because it is the most objective and is considered the “safe harbor” by
the courts.166 However, this prong is not necessarily the most “fair”
cases brought by men’s athletic teams claiming equal protection claims and reverse
discrimination).
160
See infra Part IV (proposing a new compliance standard, which would remedy the
courts’ refusal to recognize a cause of action in men’s Title IX claims).
161
See infra Parts III.B–C (discussing the downfalls of both the first and third prongs of
the Title IX compliance requirements).
162
See infra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (suggesting that a combination of two of
the compliance prongs may achieve a more equitable environment within athletic
departments); infra Part IV (suggesting a new standard, which focuses on interest in
athletic opportunities instead of focusing solely on gender).
163
See infra Parts III.B–C (discussing the downfalls of both the first and third prongs of
the Title IX compliance requirements).
164
See infra Part IV (discussing the benefits of providing schools with a more objective
and attainable standard for complying with Title IX).
165
See supra notes 35, 41 and accompanying text (discussing schools’ reliance on the
proportionality prong for Title IX compliance); see also Robertson, supra note 7, at 301
(“[P]ractical considerations make it likely that schools will choose to satisfy the
proportionality prong in order to comply with Title IX.”).
166
See GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 105 (emphasis omitted) (stating that the
proportionality standard is considered the “safe harbor” under the statute); Hatlevig, supra
note 7, at 96 (noting that compliance under the “safe harbor” prong is the most widely
pursued compliance requirement due to its objective nature); Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 319
(highlighting that cutting men’s sports teams appears to be the easiest and most clearly
defined method of Title IX compliance); Robertson, supra note 7, at 301 (noting that
compliance to the most objective of the tests—proportionality—helps prevent costly
litigation by institutions, and that the OCR has designated the proportionality test the “safe
harbor,” making it the most reliable standard).
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measure of equality.167 There have been strong reactions to the
proportionality standard and its application to college athletics.168 Title
IX applies to all aspects of federally funded education, including
extracurricular activities and classroom curriculum, as well as
athletics.169 However, the application of equal opportunities in areas
outside of sports is very different.170 In other programs, Title IX’s focus
is to allow all interested parties to participate, where in athletics the
focus is on the proportionality of participation.171 To ensure that men are
not given the majority of athletic opportunities, Title IX prohibits sex
discrimination and, in practice, if not in theory, imposes a quota
system.172

See GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 106–07 (noting that the third prong, while difficult, is
more equitable than the other prongs); Robertson, supra note 7, at 301–02 (stating that the
third prong of Title IX compliance standards—fully and effectively accommodated—is
probably the most fair and equitable measure of compliance).
168
See Hatlevig, supra note 7, at 99–100 (explaining that reliance on the proportionality
requirement creates hostility within institutions when teams are cut to save money, and
also noting that proportionality under Title IX creates an atmosphere for reverse
discrimination claims); Klinker, supra note 7, at 88 (giving a brief overview of how Title IX
proportionality affects collegiate teams, especially men’s low-revenue-producing
programs); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306–07 (discussing the negative effects resulting
from the proportionality requirement, such as quota systems, discrimination against men
based solely on gender, and divergence from the original goal of the enactment).
169
See Daniel, supra note 7, at 293 (noting that the Title IX statute doesn’t mention
athletics specifically and that it refers to all educational activities); Robertson, supra note 7,
at 304–05 (explaining Title IX compliance as it relates to other areas of education, such as
classroom settings).
170
See Robertson, supra note 7, at 305 (noting that schools do not have separate male and
female engineering majors within an institution, and therefore Title IX does not require that
an equal number of engineering spots be filled by men and women, but rather that no one
will be denied the opportunity to join the engineering program based on his or her sex); see
also id. (explaining that the proportionality standard is applied differently to athletics
where opportunities are designated based on gender).
171
See Daniel, supra note 7, at 261–62 n.25 (quoting B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who
Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 647, 648 (1995))
(contemplating whether equality is determined by equal opportunity or equal
participation, and that the debate is further complicated by the segregation of genders);
Robertson, supra note 7, at 305 (noting that removing gender designations in athletics
would allow focus to return to interest in participating and therefore create a less
discriminatory method for enforcing Title IX, but the practical effect would be a decline in
women’s participation in sports); see also supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing
Title IX’s focus when considering areas outside of athletics).
172
See Reuscher, supra note 7, at 157 (recognizing that despite the original intent and
legislative history of Title IX, it currently operates as a quota system rather than an antidiscrimination statute); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that by managing the
number of roster spots on teams to fit within proportionality, Title IX essentially enforces a
quota system on participation); McEldowney, supra note 35 (explaining that “compliance”
for universities usually “means applying a quota standard”).
167
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The current use of the proportionality prong provides institutions
with a quantitative method to determine compliance under Title IX.173
Also, since the proportionality prong is so commonly used by
institutions and applied by courts, schools understand how to use the
current standard for compliance via the athletic department.174 Members
of the university, the administration, and the judicial branch can easily
apply the current standard without fear of confusion.175 This benefit
allows schools to know exactly what is expected of them to comply with
the statute.176 However, this ease of use doesn’t necessarily make the
proportionality standard the most equitable way of complying with Title
IX.177
Universities are left little practical choice when determining how to
comply with Title IX proportionality.178 The schools’ choices are creating
teams for the underrepresented gender or cutting teams for the
overrepresented gender until the ratio of student-athletes to general
enrollment is acceptable.179 Universities often feel compelled to cut

173
See Benedetto, supra note 35 (“[U]nder Title IX, there must be proportionality between
men’s and women’s teams based on the total enrollment at the school.”); McEldowney,
supra note 35 (explaining that compliance for universities usually means applying a quota
standard that requires schools to maintain the “same ratio of men and women on the
playing field as in the classroom”).
174
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that the university had to provide athletic opportunities proportionate to the gender
composition of the student body); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir.
1999) (ruling that the university’s elimination of men’s soccer and wrestling programs
helped to achieve Title IX compliance under the proportionality standard); see also
COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 909 (noting that it is simply assumed that compliance
will be measured in terms of substantial proportionality).
175
See supra notes 74, 87, 100, 106, 113 and 122 (discussing courts’ interpretations of how
to apply proportionality by evaluating the number of students in the institution’s general
enrollment compared to the number of student-athletes of each gender, thereby setting the
standard for application of proportionality).
176
See Hatlevig, supra note 7, at 92–93 (discussing the first prong of the Title IX
compliance test and noting that universities can rely on the objective nature of
proportionality when complying with Title IX).
177
See infra text accompanying notes 200–02 (noting that compliance is not best achieved
by using the proportionality standard within athletics); see also infra Part IV (proposing a
new standard that will allow schools to more equitably comply with Title IX).
178
See Eckes, supra note 7, at 697 (noting that the practical result of Title IX is that many
schools feel that the best way to comply is to cut men’s programs); Robertson, supra note 7,
at 306 (pointing out that Title IX does not require schools to cut teams, but in lieu of
creating opportunities for women in hard economic times, it seems to be the only practical
possibility).
179
See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing that compliance by
contraction is acceptable in lieu of creating more opportunities for women); see also supra
notes 34, 77 and accompanying text (noting that schools may comply with Title IX by
showing a history and continuation of program expansion).
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men’s non-revenue sports to meet the requirements due to: (1) the lack
of economic resources in college athletic departments; (2) the drain on
resources by revenue sports; and (3) the uncertainty in satisfying Title IX
using any method other than proportionality.180
There are also practicality problems with the proportionality
standard when institutions and courts try to determine how to define
substantial proportionality.181 Problems such as differences in roster-size
requirements between men’s and women’s sports, revenue production,
and levels of interest are among the major practicality concerns when
applying the proportionality standard.182 Many suggestions have been
proposed to remedy this impracticality; for instance, some argue that
revenue-producing sports and non-revenue sports should be
distinguished for Title IX purposes.183 Defining “sport” is an issue that
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 913 (noting that compliance by contraction is
consistent with 1979 OCR interpretations of the Title IX regulations, but draws battle lines
between men’s and women’s athletic teams); Marburger & Hogshead-Makar, supra note 7,
at 81–82 (recognizing that the marginal benefit of each dollar spent on football and
basketball tends to exceed the marginal benefit of each dollar spent on non-revenue sports);
Reich, supra note 7, at 553–56 (presenting problems with applying the proportionality
standard and offering a solution to these application problems); Robertson, supra note 7, at
306 (explaining that resources are needed to assist any sports team, especially high cost
revenue-producing programs, and that with a drain on these resources, institutions view
the elimination of men’s teams as the only viable solution to Title IX violations); see also
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898–99 n.15 (1st Cir. 1993) (indicating that Title IX
does not require a school to continue to add money and programs into an athletic
department, as “it can also bring itself into compliance with the first benchmark of the
accommodation test by subtraction and downgrading, that is, by reducing opportunities
for the overrepresented gender”).
181
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999)
(implying that institutions striving to be within five percentage points when evaluating the
student-athlete to general enrollment ratio will be considered in compliance with the
proportionality requirement); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th
Cir. 1993) (noting that the ratio of student-athletes to general enrollment does not have to
be exactly the same when determining proportionality, because if the two numbers are
substantially similar, they will be accepted); see also GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at 64 (noting
that men’s athletic teams have become the victim of Title IX regarding compliance with the
substantial proportionality requirement because they have historically been larger and
better-funded).
182
See infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that would help
solve problems presented when applying the proportionality standard to athletic
departments).
183
See Reich, supra note 7, at 553 (discussing that in most schools, the major revenueproducing sports, such as football and basketball, allow non-revenue sports to exist). In
2000, the average profit (revenue minus costs) generated from football and basketball alone
was roughly $1.8 million, while all of women’s sports produced a $1.7 million deficit;
therefore, revenue-producing sports should be exempt from the proportionality
requirement because they make it possible for all other sports to operate. Id.; see also
Robertson, supra note 7, at 308 (noting large differences between revenue-producing sports
180
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has also incurred much debate.184 Finally, the most prevalent argument
has been that proportionality would be more fairly assessed by
eliminating football from the proportionality equation.185 All of these
proposed solutions would dramatically enhance the practicality of the
proportionality standard for Title IX compliance by making application
more equitable.186 However, these arguments have either been expressly
rejected by courts or not accepted in Title IX interpretations.187 Applying
and non-revenue sports of any gender, and that men’s non-revenue sports are suffering the
consequences of the proportionality requirement’s interpretation solely because of their
gender, which is a result that seems to attack the core purpose of Title IX).
184
See Letter From Nat’l Coordinator of Title IX Athletics, supra note 42 (explaining that
the OCR makes various inquiries when determining whether an activity is a “sport”). To
determine whether the activity is a sport, the OCR will consider the following on a case-bycase basis:
[W]hether selection for the team is based upon objective factors related
primarily to athletic ability;
[W]hether the activity is limited to a defined season;
[W]hether the team prepares for and engages in competition in the
same way as other teams in the athletic program with respect to
coaching, recruitment, budget, try-outs and eligibility, and length and
number of practice sessions and competitive opportunities;
[W]hether the activity is administered by the athletic department; and,
[W]hether the primary purpose of the activity is athletic competition
and not the support or promotion of other athletes.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 94 (D. Conn
2010) (ruling that cheerleading could not be used in the proportionality equation because it
was not a sport according to the NCAA and therefore not governed by Title IX); Reich,
supra note 7, at 556–57 (noting that the OCR is currently responsible for defining what is
considered an “athletic opportunity” under the statute, and the definition that is currently
used removes many possible student-athletes, such as competitive cheerleaders, from the
equation).
185
Reich, supra note 7, at 550–53 (providing statistics regarding female and male
participation in sports, and specifically discussing the possibility of exempting football and
basketball programs for Title IX purposes). According to the NCAA, in 1999–2000, male
athletic participants at Division I schools averaged 233.3, compared to 162.6 female athletes;
however, 116.8 of the male athletes at these schools participated in football. Id. at 553.
Because there is no equivalent women’s sport in terms of roster spots, football skews the
results of equal participation in sports. Id. If football is removed from the above
calculation, female athletes actually outnumber male athletes 162.6 to 116.5. Id.
186
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 875 (discussing the impracticality of the three-prong test);
Robertson, supra note 7, at 322 (noting that the purpose of Title IX is to create opportunities,
and if the proportionality prong continues to be applied as it has been, opportunities for all
athletes will decrease, therefore causing a drop in interest in non-revenue men’s sports as
well as women’s sports).
187
See Reich, supra note 7, at 569–70 (recognizing that the suggestions to adjust the
proportionality standard to make it more reasonable have fallen on deaf ears in the OCR
and the courts); see also Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 342 (3d Cir. 1993) (ruling that
even though IUP offered more men’s teams than women’s teams, the focus should be on
the total number of athletes when determining proportionality); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991
F.2d 888, 900 (1st Cir. 1993) (giving deference to the interpretation of the OCR and,
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any of these proposed remedies would account for the realistic
discrepancies between sports teams and would create a more equitable
standard for Title IX compliance under the proportionality prong.188
The final argument for improving the practicality of Title IX
compliance has been to use a relative-interest proportionality standard.189
Under this standard, the ratio of participating student-athletes would
need to be proportionate to the level of comparative interest in
participating in athletics.190 This argument is supported by evidence
suggesting that the general student body is often not comparable to the
pool from which athletes are drawn.191 In many cases, more women
attend institutions of higher education for the sole purpose of obtaining a
degree, rather than participating in athletics.192 The opposite is often
true in the case of men; athletics play a much more important role in
their decision to attend a college.193 Additionally, some argue that
extracurricular activities should be evaluated as a whole instead of
individually by program since the relative interest in other areas of
therefore, evaluating compliance based on student-athletes, not total teams provided, while
also rejecting Brown’s claim that proportionality should be based on relative interest
instead of general student enrollment).
188
See supra notes 183–87 and accompanying text (providing various proposed remedies
to resolve the issues resulting from the proportionality requirement under Title IX).
189
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 (arguing that the institution should be allowed to
satisfactorily accommodate female interest by offering “athletic opportunities to women in
accordance with the ratio of interested and able women . . . regardless of the number of unserved
women or the percentage of the student body that they comprise”).
190
See id. (“[T]o the extent students’ interests in athletics are disproportionate by gender,
colleges should be allowed to meet those interests incompletely as long as the school’s
response is in direct proportion to the comparative levels of interest.”).
191
See Jurewitz, supra note 7, at 288 (discussing the difference in the recruitment of
athletes and students when compiling a student body); Robertson, supra note 7, at 307
(noting that “college athletes are drawn from the pool of eligible people with the talent and
interest in college athletics, which includes people from all over the globe,” while often
times the general enrollment of a school is limited to a more centralized geographic area).
192
See Robertson, supra note 7, at 308 (discussing that women’s athletics are often viewed
as extracurricular activities that complement the primary purpose of obtaining a quality
education). See generally Favia, 7 F.3d at 335 (noting that 56% of the university’s population
consisted of female students, but only 38% competed in athletics); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd.
of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (“During the three years that were the subject
of . . . review, the differences between women enrolled and women athletes were 7.5%,
12.5%, and 12.7%.”); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (acknowledging the disproportionate ratio of
female student-athletes to women as general members of an institution’s enrollment).
193
See Reich, supra note 7, at 569 (noting that the desire to participate is often higher in
men, and providing that the average men’s track team will attract thirty-two members,
while the corresponding female team will attract only twenty-seven); Robertson, supra note
7, at 308 (noting that men’s athletics, especially revenue-producing sports, tend to take the
priority in a student’s life over his academics, thereby causing the apparent discrepancy in
interest). See generally Cohen, 991 F.2d at 892 (noting the swing in enrollment numbers from
the 1970s to the present day and accounting for part of the proportionality problem).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss2/8

Ambrosius: Title IX: Creating Unequal Equality through Application of the Pr

2012]

Unequal Equality

593

education—such as music and theatre—tends to be higher in women;
and, therefore, the overall ratio of extracurricular participants is
relatively equal.194 Looking at relative interest when determining
proportionality of participation is a more fair assessment of equality of
opportunities than the general enrollment standard.195
The relative-interest standard has been rejected by courts, however,
in favor of the standard proportionality equation.196 As mentioned
earlier, it has been noted that opportunity breeds interest in athletics.197
Therefore, limiting opportunities to the amount of interest currently
assumed would suppress the advancement of any sport, but specifically
women’s sports.198 Also, by relying on relative interest, the school
detracts from the legislature’s desire to remedy past discrimination
against women in educational settings and promotes stereotypes about
women in athletics.199 Finally, it is argued that the relative-interest
standard causes problems in assessing the interest level due to its
subjective nature.200

194
See Hueben, supra note 7, at 673–74 (stating that the proportionality challenge, under
Title IX, is that athletics tend to get separated from all other collegiate activities); Robertson,
supra note 7, at 308 (noting that other extracurricular activities apply a different standard
than athletic departments are required to apply when assessing Title IX compliance).
195
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 899 (discussing Brown’s argument that comparative interest
better assesses the satisfaction of the program based on those that are actually willing and
able to participate).
196
See id. at 899–900 (ruling that Brown’s argument that the proportionality standard
should be a relative interest was wrong as a matter of law and policy, stating that the
policy would stifle advancement of women in athletics and promote common stereotypes);
see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting that other jurisdictions had rejected the “relative interests” argument, and that a
school can comply with Title IX by providing opportunities proportionate to the general
enrollment of the university, and therefore, followed suit).
197
See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900 (stating that opportunity breeds interest and women would
benefit from expansion of opportunities).
198
See id. (stating that evaluating interest and ability under situations where women are
provided less opportunities would not be an effective assessment of true interest); see also
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 846 (discussing that the Model Survey, a tool to judge interest,
creates a standard that institutions rely on, and possibly creates a system where the status
quo is continued and new opportunities no longer seem to be necessary); Reich, supra note
7, at 556–57 (noting that the OCR’s interpretation of “athletic opportunities” may be
partially to blame for limitations on female participation under Title IX, rather than
unfounded stereotypes).
199
See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’ desire to remedy past
discrimination under Title IX).
200
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 841–46 (discussing ambiguities under the Model Survey
of judging interest, and noting that problems include response rates, passive responses,
and the subjective nature of questions).
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Even though most schools choose to comply with the proportionality
standard, there are many problems with its practicality.201 Aside from
creating a quota system that institutions must follow, it often creates a
Title IX’s
reverse discrimination effect against men’s teams.202
proportionality standard is not the most effective method of achieving
equality, though it is often the easiest.203
C. The Fully and Effectively Accommodated Standard
The third prong of the Title IX compliance test is a more equitable
method of providing equal opportunities for members of both
Determining whether there is full and effective
genders.204
accommodation depends on many factors such as satisfaction in the
current program, whether there is unmet interest, and whether there is a
waste of adequate talent by not providing a given athletic team.205
Evaluating interest in athletic opportunities would allow athletic
departments to offer programs that equally accommodate all parties,
which is what the third prong attempts to achieve.206 However, there are
drawbacks to this compliance requirement as well.207

201
See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text (discussing the practicality problems
with Title IX’s proportionality standard as it is currently applied to institutions).
202
See Reuscher, supra note 7, at 157 (recognizing that despite the original intent and
legislative history of Title IX, it currently operates as a quota system and not an antidiscrimination statute); Robertson, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that by managing the
number of roster spots on teams to fit within proportionality, Title IX essentially enforces a
quota system on participation).
203
See Robertson, supra note 7, at 302 (noting that the third prong of the compliance test is
probably the most fair and equitable measure of compliance, but is hard to satisfy).
204
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 836 (stating that allowing schools to use surveys to assess
interest in athletics provides a more accurate representation of students’ needs and
therefore is a better option for Title IX compliance); Robertson, supra note 7, at 304 (noting
that focusing on interest instead of hard numbers to determine Title IX compliance is a
more equitable way of assessing accommodation).
205
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (noting that unmet interest and satisfaction
in the current program should be factors used to determine Title IX compliance under the
third prong of the test); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 904 (1st Cir. 1993)
(stating that there would be a waste of talent and interest if Brown University was allowed
to cut the women’s gymnastics and volleyball teams, and therefore they had not “fully and
effectively” accommodated the female athletes).
206
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (setting out guidelines for institutions to
use when evaluating interest and ability and, therefore, creating a more practical
alternative to the proportionality standard); see also Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 836 (stating
that allowing schools to use surveys to assess interest in athletics provides a more accurate
representation of students’ needs and therefore is a better option for Title IX compliance).
207
See infra notes 208–17 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the current
Title IX standards under the third prong of the compliance requirements).
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The first, and largest, problem with the third prong of the
compliance test is the subjectivity of the regulation’s language and the
interpretation by the OCR and courts.208 Whether there is unmet interest
and ability is assessed first when determining Title IX compliance under
this prong.209 Unmet interest and ability, along with a reasonable
expectation for a competitive team, are the only guidelines that are given
under the fully and effectively accommodated test.210 Questions arise as
to how to define “interest,” “ability,” and “competitive” in this
context.211 It is presumed that there is a necessary level of interest and
ability when a team is being cut from an athletic program, regardless of
the reason given for the cuts.212 Finally, there may also be difficulty in
determining the level of interest in other areas, such as community
support, financing, and coaching, which add to the confusion in
applying the standard.213 This subjective approach to measuring interest
and ability creates a problem for institutions looking to comply under
this prong of the compliance test.214

208
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 833 (noting that part of the problem with the Model
Survey was the lack of a clear standard to assess interest and ability, and also stating that
the third prong of the compliance test is often skipped when determining compliance
because schools are nervous about litigation and proving accommodation).
209
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (stating that unmet interest is measured by
the following criteria: “whether an institution uses nondiscriminatory methods of
assessment when determining the athletic interests and abilities of its students; whether a
viable team for the underrepresented sex recently was eliminated; multiple indicators of
interest; multiple indicators of ability; and frequency of conducting assessments”).
210
See id. (noting that when determining compliance for the third prong, the OCR will
consider whether there is unmet interest, sufficient ability to sustain a team in the sport,
and whether there is a reasonable expectation of competition for the team).
211
See id. (setting out criteria for assessment of the three factors, as the purpose is to
provide a clearer standard of assessment under the third prong); see also Buzuvis, supra
note 7, at 836 (discussing how the lack of concrete definitions creates confusion for
institutions looking to show that interest and ability have been accommodated).
212
See Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643, 648 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that once Duke
allowed Mercer to try out for the team, revoking her ability to play showed that her interest
and ability was unmet, and this was the starting point for Title IX analysis); Favia v. Ind.
Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the elimination of women’s sports
teams showed interest and ability sufficient to invoke analysis under the third prong of the
compliance test); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 902 (1st. Cir. 1993) (noting that since
the team brought an action under Title IX, the school was presumed not to be “fully and
effectively” accommodating student-athletes).
213
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 851–56 (discussing the role of coaches, educators, and the
community in shaping and determining interest and ability in athletics).
214
See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905–06 (stating that the third prong of Title IX
compliance creates a difficult, but not impossible standard); GLOVER, JR., supra note 58, at
106–07 (noting that the first prong is often used in Title IX due to its ease, but that the third
prong, while difficult, is more equitable).
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The courts have also had trouble articulating how institutions should
apply the third-prong of the Title IX compliance requirements. Most
courts have noted that the standard of full and effective accommodation
is high, yet not unattainable, but have never given any concrete methods
that would satisfy this prong.215 With the lack of direction in applying
this prong and the fear of costly lawsuits, universities are often afraid to
attempt to comply with Title IX through this prong and, consequently,
must rely on other compliance standards.216 This creates problems in the
true equality of college athletic programs.217
In spite of these ambiguities, interest is a better way of assessing the
satisfaction in opportunities provided in an athletic department than
proportionality; therefore, the third prong of the compliance test is still a
viable option for schools to consider.218 As previously noted, the
standard is high, but it is not impossible to meet; if done correctly,
gender equity in athletics may finally hit a point where all members are

215
See Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that an institution may
assess interest as it sees fit to comply with Title IX’s third prong); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900
(noting that the third prong of the compliance test is often difficult to assess due to the
subjective nature of evaluating interest); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905
(noting that although the third prong sets a high standard, it is not absolute); Hueben, supra
note 7, at 669 (discussing the “effective accommodation test” and how it applies in limited
circumstances).
216
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 833 (stating that because the OCR’s multifactor approach
to prong three is based on qualitative, subjective factors, institutions are uncertain of
whether their athletic programs satisfy the standard or whether they can successfully
defend the program in court); Hueben, supra note 7, at 681 (“[M]easuring women’s interest
in sports . . . [is] much more difficult than simply matching up numbers.”).
217
See generally Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 1999)
(alleging a Title IX and equal protection violation by a university for eliminating a number
of roster spots on the men’s wrestling team to comply with Title IX proportionality);
Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633, 636 (7th Cir. 1999) (presenting a lawsuit
involving male athletes who brought claims against a university for violating Title IX and
discriminating based on sex when it eliminated the men’s soccer and wrestling programs to
comply with Title IX’s proportionality requirement); Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267 (involving a case
where athletes alleged that Title IX was violated when the men’s swimming program was
cut, but the women’s program was retained); Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675
F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (W.D. Va. 2009) (claiming that Title IX regulations that imposed gender
equality in federally financed programs and resulted in the elimination of athletic teams
were unconstitutional).
218
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (setting out criteria for assessment of the
three factors and noting that the purpose is to provide a clearer standard of assessment
under the third prong); see also COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 36, at 905–06 (stating that the
third prong of Title IX compliance creates a difficult, but not impossible standard); GLOVER,
JR., supra note 58, at 106–07 (noting that the first prong is often used in Title IX due to its
ease, but that the third prong, while difficult, is more equitable); Buzuvis, supra note 7, at
875 (noting that with some changes to the interpretation, the third prong of the test and
even the Model Survey could be a good assessment of Title IX compliance).
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satisfied with the system.219 With the recent OCR clarification, the
ambiguities in how to assess interest and abilities should lessen and
therefore make this particular prong even stronger.220
Although no single compliance standard under Title IX is a perfect
solution to offering truly equal opportunities in athletics, equality may
be reached by combining the current requirements in a more practical
way.221 The negative effects of the proportionality standard may be
balanced by the positive effects of the fully and effectively
Ultimately, if an
accommodated requirement, and vice versa.222
institution is given a more concrete way of adequately assessing the level
of interest in athletic programs and is able to offer opportunities that
correspond to that level of interest, Title IX may finally produce a system
that offers true equality.223
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Title IX has lost its focus on equality and providing equal
opportunities, regardless of sex, due to the current application of the
OCR’s three prong test.224 When assessing Title IX complaints, courts
have repeatedly shown deference to the agency’s methods of
determining compliance.225 This usually falls on the proportionality
219
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (explaining the standards for meeting
the third prong of the Title IX compliance requirement and the difficulty in reaching full
and effective accommodation).
220
See Letter from Russlynn Ali, supra note 33 (setting out criteria for assessment of the
three factors and noting that the purpose is to provide a clearer standard of assessment
under the third prong); see also Hosick, supra note 47 (stating that NCAA President, Jim
Ische, was optimistic about the new clarification and its potential effect on Title IX
compliance).
221
See supra Parts III.B–C (discussing the shortcomings of both the proportionality and
fully and effectively accommodated standards under Title IX compliance); see also infra Part
IV (discussing the benefits of combining these two prongs into a more objective standard).
222
See Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 875 (noting that the OCR may rescind the Model Survey
under prong three, but it must also provide additional clarification if it expects institutions
to understand its requirements because subjective standards send mixed messages); Reich,
supra note 7, at 549–50 (discussing recommendations for future interpretation of Title IX,
including redefining some of the language and interpreting the prongs in a manner
consistent with the intent of Title IX).
223
See infra Part IV (discussing the benefits of providing schools with a more objective
and attainable standard for complying with Title IX).
224
See supra Part III (evaluating the shortcomings of the Title IX compliance requirements
and their current application).
225
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. St. Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that the clarifications issued by the OCR deserved substantial deference); Kelley v. Bd. of
Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “where Congress has specifically
delegated” regulation to an agency, the court “must accord the ensuing regulation
considerable deference”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The
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standard of the three prong test, which has caused new forms of sex
discrimination.226 To provide opportunities that are truly fair and not
based solely on gender, the OCR should amend its compliance test to
focus on interest and providing opportunities that coincide with the
assessed level of interest, so all students are equally accommodated. The
compliance test should also be amended to provide schools with a
practical and objective standard that can easily be applied to athletic
departments.
The OCR, which is in charge of ensuring that educational institutions
are in compliance with Title IX, should amend its Policy Interpretation to
outline the three-part test as follows:
Proposed Amendment to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44
Fed. Reg. 71,418227
a. Compliance will be assessed in any one either of
the following ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation
opportunities for male and female students are
provided in numbers substantially proportionate to
their respective enrollments determined level of
interest as provided in parts b and c of this regulation; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been
and are underrepresented among intercollegiate
athletes, [W]hether the institution can show a
history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of
that sex student body.
(3) Where the members of one sex are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes,
and the institution cannot show a continuing
degree of deference [given] is particularly high in Title IX cases because Congress explicitly
delegated to the agency the task of prescribing standards for athletic programs.”); Equity in
Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp. 2d 660, 676 (W.D. Va. 2009) (concluding that
the OCR’s 1979 Policy Interpretation constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the Title IX
regulations and therefore is entitled to deference).
226
See supra Parts II.C.1–2 (discussing cases under Title IX and the courts’ reliance on the
proportionality standard as a “safe harbor” for Title IX compliance, which allows schools to
comply by cutting men’s teams).
227
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
The proposals are the contributions of the author. Specifically, proposed additions are
italicized and proposed deletions are struck. The language in regular font is taken from the
original regulation.
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practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by
the present program.
b. Interest shall be determined by assessing all of the
following criteria:
(1) Number of interested participants in an athletic
opportunity;
(2) Number of available and interested support staff
for an athletic opportunity, including but not limited to,
coaches, trainers, tutors, and other management;
(3) Amount of available resources within the athletic
department that may be provided to an athletic
opportunity;
(4) Amount of potential outside donations that the
institution will incur from an athletic opportunity;
(5) Level of interest in television, radio, and other
broadcast mediums within the area for an athletic
opportunity;
(6) Level of expected community interest and
involvement in an athletic opportunity;
(7) Level of expected competition within the
institution’s normal competitive region for an athletic
opportunity.
c. Institutions are not required to upgrade teams to
intercollegiate
status
or
otherwise
develop
intercollegiate sports absent a reasonable expectation
that intercollegiate competition in that sport will be
available within the institution’s normal competitive
regions shall evaluate the above factors to determine the
quantitative level of interest in current and potential athletic
opportunities. Institutions shall determine this level of
interest yearly by evaluating current and potential athletic
offerings.
Commentary
The amended regulation makes the necessary changes to allow
institutions to provide athletic opportunities that reflect the interest of
the student body, the surrounding community, and any other followers
of the athletic department. It shifts the focus of the compliance
requirements from proportionality of gender to interest, allowing
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institutions to provide opportunities that equally accommodate all
interested parties.
First, in section a, the proposed amendment changes the compliance
test from a three-prong test to a two-prong test.228 Institutions can
comply with the amended regulations by either offering opportunities
based on proportionality of interest in athletic opportunities, or by
showing a history and continuance of providing opportunities
responsive to the interests and abilities of the student body. By adding
the element of interest to the first prong, the subjective fully and
effectively accommodated prong is no longer necessary since
accommodation is factored into the first prong of the new test. This
eliminates some of the confusion for institutions who wish to use interest
as a Title IX standard.229
Since it is impossible for an institution to provide all the
opportunities that may be desired, the proposed amendment still allows
the use of proportionality; but, instead of focusing on general enrollment
numbers—which do not consider personal preferences in educational
experience—it focuses on the interest in the athletic department.230
Courts have often noted that opportunity breeds interest and that by
allowing schools to use relative interest as a standard for compliance,
institutions will be adding to the status quo and stereotype that women
are generally less interested in athletics.231 However, by using a
quantitative evaluation of interest, this problem will resolve itself
because interest levels won’t be based on stereotypes or assumptions,
but on numbers collected by the athletic department. The objective
standard that is created by the proposed amendments removes bias,
stereotypes, and skewed thinking when determining what athletic
opportunities to offer, and replaces these mentalities with quantitative
numbers that assess actual interest and ability of the program.232 By

228
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (discussing the original regulations for
Title IX compliance set forth by the OCR in the 1979 Policy Interpretation).
229
See supra notes 208–11 (discussing the subjective nature of the third prong of the Title
IX compliance requirements—fully and effectively accommodated—and the problems
associated with this subjective standard).
230
See supra note 191 (discussing that college athletes are drawn from the pool of eligible
people with the talent and interest in college athletics, which includes people from all over
the globe, while often times the general enrollment of a school is limited to a more
centralized geographic area).
231
See supra notes 189–200 and accompanying text (discussing the relative-interest
argument as viewed by courts and other academics).
232
See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text (discussing the relative interest
argument of Title IX compliance and the stereotyped mindsets that often occur when using
the subjective interest standard).
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using the new proposed system of assessment, interest will breed
opportunities that are well supported and competitive.
The second prong of the amended compliance test, under section a,
again takes the focus away from gender and puts it on interest and
ability. If an institution can show a history and continuation of
providing athletic opportunities, which reflects the interests and abilities
of all members of the student body who wish to participate, Title IX
would be presumed satisfied. This prong would act as a “safeguard” for
universities that do not want to worry about assessing interest, but can
show program expansion that accommodates the general student
body.233 Essentially, this prong would create an option and give
institutions an alternative to the standard assessment under the new
Title IX interest regulation outlined in subsection (1).
As stated above, the third prong of the original compliance
requirements has been removed under section a, due to its application
difficulty and subjective nature, and has been added to the
proportionality standard in subsection (1).234 By allowing schools to
comply with Title IX through evaluating and focusing on an objective
standard of interest instead of the athletes’ gender, institutions will be
able to provide opportunities based on interest and estimated
competitiveness that accommodate all parties equally. It is likely that
even under the new standard, some athletes will still feel they are not
completely accommodated by the offerings of an athletic department.
However, under the amended regulation, it can be presumed that this is
the result of a lack of interest and competitiveness in a particular
opportunity, and not because of the athletes’ gender.235
This revision also provides institutions with objective, practical, and
measurable standards to evaluate interest in athletic opportunities under
section b of the amended regulations.236 Criteria (1) and (2), under
233
The second prong of the compliance test would allow institutions to be presumed
compliant under Title IX as long as there are no recorded complaints alleging
discrimination or lack of opportunities in the athletic department. If a university can show
that the athletic department has satisfied its students by offering programs that
accommodate its student body, the school will be viewed as compliant under Title IX.
234
See supra notes 208–11 (discussing the subjective nature of the third prong of the Title
IX compliance requirements—fully and effectively accommodated—and the problems
associated with this subjective standard). By adding assessment of accommodation based
on interest and ability to the first prong of the compliance test, institutions are able to
provide athletic opportunities that meet an objective standard and therefore are more
equitable.
235
See infra notes 237–45 and accompanying text (discussing the quantitative standards of
the new proposed regulations and the benefits of the objective standard).
236
Section b of the above revised regulation is the original idea of the author and not an
amendment or revision of any current standard. Each of the subsections under this
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section b, will provide an institution with a quantitative number of
interested participants in a given sport.237 If this number is large enough
to sustain a competitive team, the institution should move on to
evaluating criteria (3) and (4), which focus on the amount of resources
available to an athletic opportunity.238 Institutional resources are often
limited, which further evidences the importance of this criteria when
determining what teams should be offered by an athletic department.239
During hard economic times, institutions find it more difficult to provide
adequate athletic opportunities.240 These factors will give the athletic
department a clear view of whether there are adequate funds to support
a particular team.241
Next, institutions will evaluate the level of support the team will
receive from outside sources, such as broadcast media and the
surrounding community. Institutions should use evaluation tools such
as Likert scales, which are designed to measure interest using a standard
five-point scale, to assess the level of interest in the sources listed in

provision are designed to measure interest, abilities, and resources available for proposed
athletic opportunities in an objective and measurable manner. The criteria under section b
should be used to assess the level of interest in a program under section a(1) above. To
better understand how this criteria should be assessed, a hypothetical scenario will be
used. PU is evaluating interest in the men’s hockey team under section a(1) of the new
Title IX compliance standard by using the criteria set out in section b of this regulation.
237
Under subsection (1), PU assesses that there are twenty-two willing and able students
who are interested in participating on the men’s hockey team. Under subsection (2) of the
criteria, PU determines that four well-known and qualified individuals would be interested
in coaching the men’s hockey team, two members of the university’s training staff would
be interested in working with the team, and three members of the university’s faculty
would be willing to serve as tutors, as needed, for the members of the team during the
hockey season. There would also be four graduate assistants interested in serving as
managers, statisticians, and student coaches for the team.
238
After assessing the financial position of the athletic department, PU determines that it
can devote approximately $80,000 of its operating budget to support a men’s hockey team
each season. PU also concludes, under subsection (4), that outside donations of alumni,
sponsors, and fundraising will provide an additional $30,000 per year to the hockey
program.
239
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing the limited resources
currently available to most athletic departments and the resulting cuts in sports teams).
240
See supra notes 41, 56, 180 and accompanying text (discussing the virtual impossibility
of choices that institutions have to make in hard economic times when providing more
opportunities).
241
While the objective criteria set out in section b is helpful for institutions determining
whether an athletic opportunity is viable in hard economic times, the same standard can
also be used during times of economic stability or prosperity to assess whether an athletic
opportunity has the desired level of interest and support. The proposed assessment criteria
will be relevant and useful in all economic states.
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interest criteria (5) and (6).242 After collecting the data, institutions
would have a clear picture of whether the athletic opportunity would
have support from these outside parties in an objective, measurable
form. Finally, the institution should determine whether the proposed
athletic opportunity would be competitive within its normal region
under subsection (7).243 Once all seven factors of the above criteria have
been assessed, the institution should provide opportunities that meet all
the factors and refrain from providing opportunities that do not meet the
interest standards.244 As stated previously, it is not necessary for schools
to provide every athletic opportunity and pour money into sports to the
detriment of the athletic department and school, but an institution would
be required to offer proportionate athletic opportunities based on
quantitative interest.
Lastly, the proposed amended regulation removes the note that a
school is not required to provide opportunities in which it would not be
competitive, under section c, because this is covered by criterion (7) of

242
Under subsection (5), PU sends out a number of Likert scale surveys to assess the level
of interest in broadcast media among the local and regional areas. The questions require
broadcast stations, newspapers, and other media sources to rank, on a scale of one to five—
one being “completely uninterested” and five being “extremely interested”—their interest
in covering news about the men’s hockey program. Areas of inquisition include game
scores and highlights, roster or coaching changes, recruitment, community involvement by
the members of the team, and other newsworthy information. After retrieving the
responses and averaging the results, PU determines that the media industry would be
“very interested” (a 4 on the Likert scale) in covering news about the men’s hockey team.
PU then sends out similar surveys to assess the level of interest to members of the
surrounding community, including residents of the area, students and employees of PU,
members of opposing schools in PU’s athletic conference, and alumni of the university per
subsection (6). After this assessment, PU concludes that members of the community would
be “interested” (a 3 on the Likert scale) in supporting a men’s hockey team at PU.
243
PU assesses the level of competitiveness of the potential members of its own hockey
team compared to other teams that would compete against PU. A quantitative standard,
such as statistical data or another developed method of competitive evaluation, is used to
determine whether the team is a viable option for the school. This can be determined by
looking at past history, if the school is evaluating whether a current team should continue
to compete at the varsity level, or by using statistics or other objective surveys created by
the school to assess a team that has not been offered in the past. After evaluating the past
performance of the men’s hockey team, PU determines that the team would continue to be
competitive within its conference and at the national level.
244
After collecting all the data, PU should continue to offer men’s hockey as a team in its
athletic department. It has assessed that there is substantial interest within the athletic
community, as well as the outside community, to support the team. It has also determined
that financial resources support offering men’s hockey at the university, and that the team
will most likely continue to be competitive and bring exposure to the school. Based on the
numbers provided by the seven outlined criteria, men’s hockey is a feasible option that PU
should provide.
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the interest evaluation factors listed in section b.245 The new language of
this section explains that institutions shall use the above criteria to
acquire a quantitative assessment of interest in athletic opportunities,
and that this evaluation should be conducted on a yearly basis. When
researching the level of interest and sustainability of athletic
opportunities, institutions should focus on current programs as well as
programs that may be added in the future. This will allow schools to
offer athletic opportunities that are well supported, competitive, and
sustainable, thereby accommodating students, the athletic department,
the institution, and the community alike.
The proposed changes to the OCR’s regulation of Title IX compliance
will allow institutions to provide athletic opportunities that will bring
value to the school, all parties involved in the athletic department, and
the surrounding community without focusing on the gender of the
athletes. The changes create an objective standard that universities can
use in Title IX compliance assessment instead of the subjective, unclear
test currently used to assess interest under the third prong of the
compliance requirements. Under this system, equality can be achieved
by evaluating interest and ability of participants and ensuring that no
person is prohibited from participating in athletics based solely on his or
her gender, which was Title IX’s original intent.
Critics of this proposal may argue that focus on interest instead of
proportionality will hurt women’s athletics and benefit only male
athletes.246 The argument may be that this proposal could send women
back forty years to a situation similar to the 1970s, when Title IX was
considered a necessity.247 However, the proposed amendment will not
hurt women’s athletics in such a way that they will become obsolete.
Shifting the focus of compliance to a system that allows schools to use an
objective standard of viability for each team will allow women’s teams to
thrive once they show that they are willing and able to support a
competitive team.248 The objective system created by the proposed
amendments will benefit both men’s and women’s teams by allowing
245
See supra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining criterion (7) of the interest
assessment in determining whether a team will be competitive and allowing schools to
provide only opportunities in which it is reasonably assessed that teams will be successful).
246
See Hogshead-Makar, supra note 43 (noting that using interest for Title IX compliance
may have negative effects on women’s teams and may lead to more discrimination by
creating a loophole for universities).
247
See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing women’s participation in
sports before Title IX was passed and the rise in numbers of female athletes after its
enactment).
248
See supra notes 237–45 and accompanying text (discussing the quantitative standards
of the new proposal and explaining how each criterion should be applied to athletic
opportunities, and also discussing the benefits of using the objective standard).
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them to be assessed individually. Men’s and women’s teams will no
longer have to compete against each other to satisfy a quota; they will
only need to show that they can be supported on their own, thereby
creating more equitable opportunities for all athletes, regardless of
gender.
V. CONCLUSION
Title IX’s current application is causing men’s athletic teams to be cut
at an alarming rate to comply with the substantial proportionality prong
of the OCR regulations. This is contrary to the initial purpose of Title IX,
which was to prohibit discrimination in participation of activities based
solely on the individual’s sex. Women have been discriminated against
in the past, but by continuing the current application of the statute, the
discrimination has come full circle and is reducing men’s athletic
opportunities. By amending the compliance requirement to allow
institutions to focus on their students’ interests and abilities and other
outside supporters, Title IX can once again provide opportunities for all
individuals, regardless of gender, thereby creating true equality in
college athletics. Both genders will be equally represented based on
interest, ability, and competitiveness, rather than attempting to satisfy a
quota system that focuses on remedying past discrimination instead of
true equality.
After Title IX’s compliance amendment, schools will be able to offer
programs that are well supported and competitive without focusing on
the athletes’ gender. This allows students like Aaron to choose a school
that offers athletic opportunities he is interested in without worrying
that his sport will be cut based solely on the gender of the athletes.249 He
can be confident that PU will continue to provide a competitive hockey
team that allows him to enjoy his experience, the support of the
institution, and surrounding community.
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